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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has developed from traditional 
behavioural theory and seeks to reduce experiential avoidance and increase 
psychological flexibility.  It is argued to be distinct from cognitive therapy and has been 
used to treat a variety of mental health problems in addition to chronic pain.  ACT is 
linked to Relational Frame Theory and the research developments associated with this.  
One central process of ACT is termed ‘cognitive defusion’ and this process is used to 
encourage individuals to become less identified with the content of their cognitions.  It is 
important to measure the extent to which individuals become ‘fused’ with their 
cognitions and a Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ) has been developed to do this.  
The current studies build upon earlier research by subjecting the CFQ to further 
reliability and validity testing and assessment of its factor structure. 
 
Method 
A community sample was used throughout.  The majority of participants took part 
online, however, some participants completed paper copies of the questionnaires.  Study 
one had a sample of 47 and focused on construct validity of the CFQ where participants 
completed this measure and also measures of similar and distinct constructs.  The other 
measures included a mindfulness questionnaire, a measure of experiential avoidance and 
a social desirability questionnaire.  Study two concerned the test-retest reliability of the 
CFQ.  There were 82 participants in this study who completed the CFQ on two 
occasions, one month apart.  In this study, participants also completed a measure of 
anxiety and depression symptoms.  Study three had 144 participants and assessed the 
factor structure of the CFQ. 
 
Results 
Results from study one indicate that the CFQ negatively correlates with a measure of 
mindfulness and positively correlates with a measure of experiential avoidance.  This 
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study also found that the CFQ has no relationship with a measure of conscious attempts 
to appear more desirable.  Results from study two show that there is a strong positive 
correlation between scores on the CFQ at testing time one and testing time two.  The 
CFQ was also found to correlate positively with a measure of anxiety and depression 
symptoms and to mediate the relationship between anxiety scores at testing time one and 
testing time two.  Confirmatory factor analysis was used in study three to assess the 
factor structure of the CFQ and found a two factor model was the best fit for the data. 
 
Discussion 
The results are considered in relation to relevant research.  Limitations of the current 
studies are assessed and possibilities for future research discussed.  In particular, 
cognitive fusion is discussed in relation to anxiety and depression symptoms.  The 
similarities between the CFQ and a measure of experiential avoidance are discussed and 




1.1 Introduction to Acceptance & Commitment Therapy 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is described by its developers (Hayes et 
al., 2006, p.2) as one of the “third generation” of behaviour therapies.  It has been 
proposed that ACT has followed from traditional behavioural theory which aimed to 
measure behaviour which is directly observable (Cullen, 2008).  Cognitive therapy 
expanded upon traditional behaviour theory to include a cognitive element which could 
not previously be accounted for (Beck, 1970).  Hayes (2005) has suggested that ACT 
has developed from this and is a fundamentally new model.  ACT is proposed to provide 
an understanding of human behaviour and mental health problems and it is linked to 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT), a “theory of human language and cognition” developed 
from behaviour analysis (Hayes et al., 2006, p.5).  In the following paragraphs these 
concepts will be considered further to understand the position of the ACT model within 
the behavioural theory tradition. 
 
The proposal that ACT is a totally new therapy and is part of a third movement of 
behaviour therapy is not without its critics.  Other researchers consider ACT as an 
extension of the cognitive therapies, in particular Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
and while they may accept that ACT brings something new, have suggested that it is not 
sufficiently revolutionary to mark the beginning of a new behavioural movement or to 
replace CBT (Hofman & Asmundson, 2008).  ACT is not the only therapy believed to 
constitute this proposed third wave (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005).  Other interventions such 
as Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Mindfulness Based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002) and Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; 
Kabat-Zinn, 1990) are also considered by Hayes et al. (2006) as part of the third 
movement of behavioural therapies.  Hofman and Asmundson (2008) have argued, 
however, that the developers of these other therapies do not consider themselves to be 
part of this movement.  The suggested uniqueness of ACT and how it compares to 
cognitive therapies will be returned to later in more detail. 
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In order to provide an understanding of ACT it is necessary to give some description of 
this model.  Key to ACT is the concept of psychological flexibility which is described 
by Hayes et al. (2006) as “the process of contacting the present moment fully as a 
conscious human being and persisting or changing behaviour in the service of chosen 
values” (p.9).  The theory of ACT has advised that individuals’ flexibility in this respect 
can be reduced by their attempts to avoid unpleasant inner events.  It has been suggested 
that Western society generally understands uncomfortable feelings, thoughts and 
sensations as abnormal and something to be removed (Harris, 2006).  Thus anxious 
feelings, negative thoughts and a racing heart for example, are experiences to be 
avoided.  ACT terms this avoidance of uncomfortable inner events as “experiential 
avoidance” (Hayes et al., 1999, p.58).  ACT suggests that engagement in experiential 
avoidance reduces an individual’s psychological flexibility as it limits the responses they 
have in relation to such events and drives behaviour in a particular direction (Fletcher & 
Hayes, 2005).  Another contributor to psychological inflexibility is “cognitive fusion” 
(Hayes et al., 1999, p.72).  Cognitive fusion is described as the degree to which an 
individual becomes caught up in the content of their thoughts.  This results in the 
individual to some extent identifying with their thoughts and they are unable to take a 
more objective stance which would allow them to consider their thoughts as an inner 
experience rather than statements of fact (Eifert et al., 2009). 
 
The main objective of ACT, therefore, is to increase psychological flexibility.  There are 
six interrelated processes which the ACT model describes as ways of achieving this 
(Lundgren et al., 2008).  The first principle of the ACT model is acceptance, whereby 
the individual is encouraged to accept the presence of uncomfortable inner events such 
as anxious feelings and negative thoughts (Yovel, 2009).  This helps prevent avoidance 
of these events.  The second principle is termed “cognitive defusion” (Hayes et al., 
2006, p.8) and is described as a process which “change[s] the way one interacts with or 
relates to thoughts by creating contexts in which their unhelpful functions are 
diminished”.  In this context, individuals are encouraged to see their thoughts as purely 
thoughts and not accurate representations of reality (Cullen, 2008).  Cognitive fusion 
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and defusion will be considered in more detail below.  It is highlighted by Cullen (2008) 
that acceptance and cognitive defusion are similar to behavioural exposure in the respect 
that they increase exposure to the uncomfortable inner events and often reduce their 
severity over time, although this is not a specific goal of ACT. 
 
ACT also encourages the individual to make contact with the present moment in order 
that they experience events directly rather than via the cognitions which the situation 
activates.  This is established through the use of mindfulness techniques (Harris, 2006).  
Another ACT principle promotes experiencing the “self as a context” (Hayes et al., 
2006, p.9) where the individual experiences their ‘self’ as the background in which all 
inner events are experienced.  This facilitates a detachment between the individual self 
and their inner experiences so that the individual becomes less identified with these 
experiences.  The fifth principle of ACT concerns the identification of values that the 
individual wishes to live by in order that these can guide their behaviour.  The final 
principle of ACT is committed action which encourages the individual to act in ways 
which are in line with their values, despite the presence of distressing inner events 
(Yovel, 2009). 
 
The ACT model perceives these six principles as either being processes of mindfulness 
and acceptance or processes of behavioural change (Hayes et al., 2006) and different 
strategies are employed by each principle to encourage psychological flexibility.  The 
emphasis on these principles of the ACT model enables ACT to be seen as “principles-
driven rather than procedure-driven” (Wilson & Roberts, 2002, p.237).  The principles 
are not seen as entirely separate, rather they are linked and merge into each other and it 
is highlighted by Hayes (2005) that each principle has an individual influence in addition 
to a collective one.  This does, however, make it difficult to measure these principles and 
identify the degree to which each may be involved in therapeutic change. 
 
As briefly referred to above, it is not the goal of ACT to remove the symptoms of mental 
health problems or unpleasant inner events, however, this often happens as a side effect 
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(Wilson & Roberts, 2002).  In these circumstances, individuals still experience negative 
inner events but do not become involved with them or identify with them.  In therapy, 
individuals are encouraged to identify the ways in which they try to avoid or control 
their inner events, whether these attempts have reduced their ‘symptoms’ over time and 
whether they are nearer to their goals as a result of this activity (Harris, 2006).  This 
process of helping individuals to be aware that their attempts to control their inner 
events actually exacerbate them is known as “creative hopelessness” (Ciarrochi & Robb, 
2005, p.118).  In this respect, individuals are able to consider the way they relate to their 
inner events and the energy they are investing in their attempts to control them. 
 
Harris (2006) emphasised that ACT can be used in a variety of settings with individuals 
or with groups, may treat a range of difficulties (both physical and psychological) and 
can be used as either a short or long term therapy.  There is flexibility within ACT as to 
how it is administered.  Indeed, ACT therapists are encouraged to develop their own 
strategies of implementing the six main processes of ACT (Hayes et al., 1999).  There is 
recognition within ACT of individual variability which gives therapists and patients the 
flexibility to adapt ACT techniques whilst still remaining within the ACT framework 
(Hayes et al., 1999).  While the flexibility in approach is likely to be helpful when 
treating individuals, it may make it more difficult to measure ACT scientifically. 
 
It would seem that this flexibility could result in uncertainty regarding which aspects of 
ACT are helping if therapists are not all doing the same thing.  One study has helped 
highlight the flexibility of ACT in targeting different population groups (Brown & 
Hooper, 2009).  In this study, the authors used ACT to treat an individual with a learning 
disability who was experiencing “anxious and obsessive thoughts and rumination” 
(Brown & Hooper, 2009, p.197).  The participant had a full scale IQ of 44 which is 
classified as moderate to severe learning disability, thus a cognitive approach is argued 
to have been inappropriate (Brown & Hooper, 2009).  Defusion techniques and a 
measure of acceptance and avoidance were adapted for the participant.  For example, 
abstract concepts (such as letting thoughts go) were made concrete by involving the 
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participant in an activity of writing their thoughts on leaves and then letting the leaves 
float down a river (Brown & Hooper, 2009).  The participant reported a reduction in 
experiential avoidance following the intervention which was corroborated by parental 
report and maintained at four month follow up. 
 
Brown and Hooper (2009) emphasised that greater adaptations in psychological therapy 
are required for individuals with learning disabilities and acknowledged that their study 
only included one participant.  In addition to this, CBT had not been attempted with this 
individual so it is unknown if this would also have helped (Brown & Hooper, 2009).  
Although ACT encourages flexibility of approach and allows therapists to make 
adaptations, it is unclear whether these adaptations mean that the therapy then works in 
the same way.  This seems to contradict the emphasis of ACT researchers on the need 
for a scientific background to therapy.  Psychological therapies must be flexible to 
respond to individual variability, however, it then becomes more difficult to identify the 
ways in which they are operating. 
 
1.2 Theory of ACT 
Another unique aspect of ACT is understood to be its link with Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT) and the research developments related to this (Blackledge, 2007).  RFT is a 
behaviour analytic theory of language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2006) and from this 
perspective, cognition is understood to be ruled by verbal processes.  It is suggested by 
this theory that humans learn to “derive” relations between stimuli even where such 
relations have not been “directly taught” or reinforced (Blackledge, 2003, p.425).  This 
process then becomes automatic and is triggered by contextual cues.  Many researchers 
have illustrated this by giving the example that when an individual learns that A is 
equivalent to B and B is equivalent to C, they naturally derive that A must also be 
equivalent to C (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, et al., 2004).  In addition to 
this it is proposed by RFT that such derived relations between stimuli are “bidirectional” 
(Stewart & Barnes-Holmes, 2004).  That is, if A is equal to B then B is equal to A.  This 
is particularly relevant in the case of language, where, for example, it is learned that if 
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the word ‘dog’ represents a particular four legged furry creature then this creature is also 
equivalent to the word ‘dog’ (Cullen, 2008).  This demonstrates how language begins to 
assume the actual properties of what it represents.  This process is believed to be unique 
to humans (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh et al., 2004).  It is also understood 
to explain the occurrence of experiential avoidance.  From this perspective, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes Holmes, McHugh et al. (2004) state that “the bidirectional relations 
between the words and the events allow the report to acquire many of the aversive and 
painful functions of the trauma itself” (p.360).  Individuals are, therefore, more likely to 
avoid any thoughts, feelings or other inner events in the present moment which are 
associated with the trauma, despite the trauma itself not being in the here and now. 
 
RFT has also proposed that in some cases, stimuli are related based on their physically 
observable properties.  In other cases, however, the relations are more “arbitrary” so that 
individuals learn that a pound coin is bigger in value in relation to a 50 pence coin 
despite the fact that it is smaller in physical size (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
McHugh et al., 2004).  This again illustrates the role of language in this process – the 
concept of ‘bigger’ in terms of value cannot be directly observed, it is a descriptive term 
of an arbitrary concept.  In addition to this, RFT emphasises the role of context whereby 
derived relations are only made when certain contextual cues are present (Blackledge, 
2003).  A child learns, for example, that a dog is bigger than a mouse but smaller than an 
elephant.  In one context, the dog is ‘bigger’ (in the presence of a mouse).  Alternatively, 
the dog is ‘smaller’ in a different context (when next to an elephant).  This highlights the 
role that context plays and Hayes et al. (1999) have emphasised the importance of 
functional contextualism within ACT.  In relation to ACT, functional contextualism 
refers to the significance of context in producing inner events and ACT has suggested 
that context and function of such events should be the focus of change rather than the 
events themselves (Hayes et al., 1999).  Following from this, another important aspect of 
RFT is referred to as “transformation of stimulus function” (Hayes & Wilson, 2004, 
p.224).  This refers to the change in functions of one stimulus due to its relationship with 
another stimulus.  This process is again believed to be influenced by context.  Stewart 
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and Barnes-Holmes (2004) have illustrated this process by way of the use of analogy in 
ACT.  They describe the case where an individual in therapy is guided to consider their 
experiences with anxiety as being similar to being caught up in quicksand.  Due to the 
provision of verbal information (the analogy), the individual then attributes some of the 
functions of quicksand to anxiety (Stewart & Barnes-Holmes, 2004). 
 
Hofman and Asmundson (2008) proposed that this approach considers mental events 
(which are dominated by language) to become emotionally charged as a result of the 
context they occur in.  Difficulties occur when the individual tries to avoid, control or 
analyse such events rather than simply allowing them to take place and experience them 
for what they are.  To illustrate this further, learning based on verbal processes is argued 
to play a role in the development of mental health difficulties (Hayes et al., 2006).  For 
example, a child may always have played happily with dogs.  On being told, however, 
that dogs can bite, the child then relates ‘dog’ with the experience of being bitten and 
thus gets anxious around dogs, subsequently changing their behaviour in relation to 
them.  Despite never having been bitten by a dog, the function of the stimulus ‘dog’ has 
changed for the child due to the provision of verbal information about dogs and the child 
now relates ‘dog’ to a negative experience.  This highlights how learning can occur 
outside direct experience and can instead be due to verbal processes.  Indeed, Hayes et 
al. (1999) have suggested that learning through direct experience is more open to 
change, whereas learning due to verbal rules is much more difficult to influence.  In this 
case and consistent with traditional behaviour theory, avoidance is reinforced by an 
immediate reduction in anxiety.  The child thus avoids the dog due to the relations it has 
derived between dogs and a negative outcome (thoughts of being bitten).  This again 
demonstrates transformation of stimulus function. 
 
From this perspective, it is believed that language can distort reality as individuals 
become fused with the language in their thoughts rather than their direct experience 
(Blackledge, 2007).  This can be seen in the example from above where the child no 
longer approaches dogs based on what they have been told about dogs regardless of the 
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fact that their direct experience of dogs has not been unpleasant.  Cognitive fusion is 
understood to describe how individuals become caught up in their mental activities (that 
is, thoughts).  Blackledge (2007) has described this by stating that indirect experience is 
produced by “verbal processes” (p.565).  In other words, how an individual experiences 
events is influenced by the language produced in such events. 
 
Hayes and Shenk (2004) suggested that therapeutic strategies should develop from 
theory which has been guided by research in order that the processes producing clinical 
change can be studied and understood.  This allows the identification of whether new 
strategies impact upon the psychological processes they are believed to and whether this 
produces change.  Hayes et al. (1987) stated that it is not helpful simply to show that 
therapy works, but the process by which it works must also be identified.  This illustrates 
why therapy must be based upon theory.  Hayes et al. (2006) have argued that this 
process is made possible in ACT due to its links to RFT.  Where psychological strategies 
do not develop from scientific study, Hayes and Shenk (2004) have suggested they 
develop from “clinical intuition, accidental variation or mere common sense” (p.249).  
As ACT is linked to RFT, Hayes (2005) has argued that it provides an understanding of 
“basic behavioural principles, to processes of change, to applied technology, to 
empirical studies of clinical outcome” (p.133). 
 
Hayes (2008) has suggested that criticisms of ACT can occur due to a lack of 
understanding of both this therapy and RFT and it is understandable that this could 
happen given the very technical nature of RFT and the obtuse language it uses.  
Blackledge (2003) has stated that “RFT intentionally makes use of technical, non-
colloquial language to allow a scientific treatment of cognition” (p.421).  While this may 
be so, it runs the risk of alienation.  While it may be advantageous that ACT is linked to 
a body of research within RFT, RFT itself is not easily understood or accessible.  
Indeed, when Hofman and Asmundson (2008) attempted to explain RFT, they stated that 
“in order to avoid possible misinterpretation or oversimplification of the approach we 
will frequently cite the sources directly” (p.5).  The current author also experienced this 
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problem.  Therein lies a significant difficulty for the ACT/RFT approach, that is it is not 
easily explained or approached.  In order for ACT to be more widely embraced it may 
have to adjust its own language when describing RFT in order to facilitate 
understanding. 
 
1.3 Cognitive Fusion & RFT 
Following from the discussion on RFT above, it is believed that language and verbal 
processes are infused in the daily life of humans (Hayes & Wilson, 2003).  This can be 
useful in many ways, however, it can also cause difficulty.  RFT and the role of 
language in human behaviour is particularly relevant to cognitive fusion.  As mentioned, 
cognitive fusion is believed to be involved in the persistence of mental health problems 
and one of the main principles of ACT is cognitive defusion (Yovel, 2009).  These 
concepts will now be considered in greater detail. 
 
As discussed above, human language is bidirectional which results in words assuming 
the same functional properties as the stimuli they represent (Soriano et al., 2004).  Eifert 
et al. (2009) described cognitive fusion as “the tendency of human beings to get caught 
up in the content of what they are thinking” (p.373).  This occurs to the extent that 
individuals become fused with their thoughts, so that their thoughts are part of their 
identity and taken as factually correct (Greco et al., 2008).  Individuals are then 
compelled to respond to the content of thoughts because their thoughts have become part 
of them.  Soriano et al. (2004) have suggested that when cognitive fusion occurs, the 
events to be avoided are moved from a context of “there” to “here and now” (p.389).  
That is, the use of language which permeates cognitions, allows for previously occurring 
negative events to be experienced in the present moment as the uncomfortable thoughts, 
sensations and feelings related to the event are equated with the individual self.  This 
demonstrates why individuals often choose to engage in experiential avoidance – 




To illustrate cognitive fusion, Masuda et al. (2010) have used the example of an 
individual who has the thought “I am depressed” (p.11).  When fusion occurs, it follows 
that the individual identifies with this thought so that the self is equated with the word 
‘depressed’.  Cognitive fusion thus occurs when following a thought, the individual 
experiences the cognitive and emotional response that would take place were the thought 
to be literally true.  Greco et al. (2008) suggested that this results from an “attachment” 
(p.93) of the individual to the content of their inner events.  If distressing inner events 
are perceived to be true, individuals try to avoid and control them, thus resulting in 
experiential avoidance.  In terms of RFT, cognitive fusion is understood to be influenced 
by context (Blackledge, 2007).  Thus, in a context which promotes cognitive fusion, an 
individual is likely to engage in behaviours which help them avoid the experience of 
certain inner events (Greco et al., 2008).  Hayes et al. (2006) described how a “context 
of literality” (p.7) promotes fusion whereby words are taken as being one and the same 
as what they are referring to. 
 
Further to this, individuals use words to describe themselves and therefore the individual 
‘self’ becomes fused with language (Hayes et al., 1999).  This discussion highlights the 
relational nature of language and cognition and how this allows individuals to discuss 
and consider things which are not actually present (Hayes & Wilson, 2003).  This again 
illustrates the “bidirectional” function of language whereby symbols are used to 
represent stimuli (Hayes & Wilson, 2003, p.162).  Hayes et al. (2004) suggested that the 
bidirectional nature of language increases the amount of situations which are avoided as 
language enables the experience of inner events to occur in any situation. 
 
Hayes and Wilson (2003) also emphasised that language is frequently “evaluative” 
(p.162), thereby allowing individuals to categorise and make comparisons.  Inner events 
are classified as ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  It is human nature to try to make sense of things in this 
way and establish relations between things (Ciarrochi et al., 2005).  However, the 
individual then tries to encourage the ‘good’ experiences while minimising the ‘bad’.  
This also promotes experiential avoidance as discussed above.  Hayes and Wilson 
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(2003) suggested that evaluation is important for survival as it allows the individual to 
seek out environments that are considered ‘good’, for example, where there is wide 
availability of food.  Language is thus important for problem solving (Hayes & Shenk, 
2004).  In relation to inner events, however, the judgemental nature of language drives 
experiential avoidance.  The fact that individuals can often follow what they have 
learned from verbal rules rather than their direct experience is also problematic 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2005).  Verbal rules are learned from an early age, therefore they are 
rigid and difficult to change (Hayes et al., 1999). 
 
To sum up cognitive fusion, Hayes and Shenk (2004) have stated that “the ‘mind’, that 
organised repertoire of verbal relations, creates an alternative universe of derived 
stimulus functions, never quite in the present because it is always ‘about’ something.  It 
rarely is what it is” (p.252).  This further illustrates how cognitive fusion can remove the 
individual from direct experience. 
 
1.4 Cognitive Defusion 
As discussed above, one of the main processes of the ACT model is cognitive defusion.  
Blackledge (2007) stated that “defusion occurs when language use conventions are 
violated to the point that specific words or phrases lose their ability to make these 
words’ abstract referents psychologically present and appear to exert control over 
subsequent behaviour” (p.562).  In addition to this and following from the above, 
Soriano et al. (2004) have suggested that defusion occurs when the individual who is 
experiencing the uncomfortable inner events can move these events from the “here” to 
“there” (p.389).  This allows the individual to be aware of the experience of these events 
but not to identify with the properties of them.  One way in which to do this (and 
promoted by ACT) is to observe the process of thought so that the individual notices that 
they are having certain thoughts without getting fused with the content of them 
(Blackledge, 2007).  This reduces the literality of thought (thus changing the context) 
and encourages the individual to be more objective about their thoughts.  They can also 
name their thoughts and emotions or use mindfulness techniques to achieve cognitive 
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defusion (Blackledge, 2007).  Interfering with the usual rules of language also produces 
defusion, for example, by repeating the same word continuously, talking at a different 
rate and pitch or singing words rather than saying them (Blackledge, 2007). 
 
Cognitive defusion is different to other cognitive strategies as it does not attempt to alter 
the content of cognitions (Blackledge, 2007).  Rather it aims to change the function and 
context of these cognitions.  It does this through interrupting the verbal processes which 
attribute and alter the functions of cognitions so that words no longer produce the mental 
images and emotions associated with them (Blackledge, 2007).  This results in a change 
in the relationship an individual has with their inner events (Eifert et al., 2009).  For 
example, being aware of the process of thought creates a different context to focusing on 
the content of thoughts (Hayes et al., 1999).  This change of context allows the 
individual to adopt a more distanced and objective stance to their thoughts instead of 
becoming involved with them or identifying with them (Blackledge, 2007).  By being 
aware of the process of thought, the individual has a greater range of responses available 
to them.  This contrasts with responses which are limited by focusing purely on the 
content of thought (Hayes et al., 1999).  For example, an individual may think ‘I am 
anxious in this place, I’ve got to get out of here’ and therefore have the urge to leave the 
situation they are in.  Alternatively, if the individual thinks ‘I am having the thought that 
I must get out of here’, this highlights to them that whilst they may feel anxious and 
have the urge to leave, they do not necessarily need to act on the thought ‘I’ve got to get 
out of here’.  This is believed to increase flexibility of response (Hayes & Shenk, 2004).  
Considering the process of thought expands the individual’s awareness so they see more 
to the thought than purely its content. 
 
Cognitive defusion is also believed to facilitate the operation of the other ACT principles 
(Fletcher & Hayes, 2005).  It enables acceptance of inner events as these events are no 
longer seen as factual.  It also encourages contact with the present moment as the 
individual is less caught up in their thoughts and more open to direct experience.  By 
allowing the individual to separate from their thoughts, defusion also facilitates a sense 
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of self as context.  It increases flexibility of response, thus allowing the individual to 
respond in a greater number of ways and in line with their chosen values (Fletcher & 
Hayes, 2005).  Blackledge (2007) cautioned that cognitive defusion is not a state to be 
achieved.  Instead, defusion can come and go.  It is not an extreme and is not permanent. 
 
1.5 Studies Considering Defusion 
As discussed, ACT is believed to work partly through the process of defusion (Healy et 
al., 2008).  In order for this belief to be demonstrated, the process of defusion must be 
isolated from the other components of ACT to allow its measurement.  Further to this, 
Masuda et al. (2004) stated that it is still unclear which defusion techniques are 
effective.  In their study, Masuda et al. (2004) focussed on the specific defusion 
technique of repeating a single word continuously.  They suggested that this removes the 
context which is needed to make the word meaningful.  Masuda et al. (2004) found that 
this technique reduced the strength of belief and emotional response to negative self-
generated statements in eight participants.  This study used a very small student sample 
who were given incentives to participate and the outcome was measured by self-report.   
 
Masuda et al. (2010) built upon the earlier study by comparing a cognitive defusion 
technique with thought distraction and a control condition and found that the defusion 
technique lowered distress and strength of belief in a negative self-related thought.  
Masuda et al. (2010) again used a student sample, however, they found the defusion 
technique worked for those with and without depressive symptoms.  In this study, while 
the distraction technique was found to be less effective than defusion, it was still more 
effective than the control condition.  Masuda et al. (2010) suggested that this may 
indicate that defusion and distraction are not as distinct as ACT proposes.  They also 
found variability within each group after the interventions and suggested that the 
techniques may vary in their impact upon different people.  The outcome in this study 
was also measured by self-report and no follow up was carried out to consider whether 
the changes were maintained. 
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A similar study was carried out by Healy et al. (2008), however, they used a different 
defusion strategy whereby individuals read negative statements about themselves 
preceded by the words “I’m having the thought that …..” (p.625).  Consistent with 
expectations, it was found that this technique increased willingness to read the negative 
self-statements and reduced the emotional distress associated with them (Healy et al., 
2008).  Unexpectedly, however, the extent to which the participants believed the 
statements was found to increase when using the defusion technique.  Healy et al. (2008) 
suggested this may have been due to the manner in which the extent of the belief was 
measured – that is, it was measuring the whole statement, including the defusion phrase.  
In this sense, they argued, this result may actually support defusion.  Further research 
will be required to see if this is actually the case.  In addition to this, Healy et al. (2008) 
found that defusion had less impact upon positive self-statements and suggested that 
defusion may have greater influence on distressing mental contents as individuals are 
more likely to try to avoid them.  This study also used a small student sample and 
depended on self-report measures. 
 
Cognitive fusion and defusion have also been considered in relation to parenting and 
Coyne and Wilson (2004) presented a case study of a child whose behaviour was 
targeted by a behavioural intervention which incorporates defusion techniques.  This 
further emphasises the extent to which cognitive fusion permeates every day life and the 
potentially wide applicability of this ACT technique (Coyne & Wilson, 2004).  This 
study was limited, however, by its use of a single case study.  In addition to this, the 
ACT intervention was combined with “parent-child interaction therapy” (Coyne & 
Wilson, 2004, p.481) which makes it difficult to identify which aspect of the 
intervention was beneficial. 
 
Defusion techniques were also used as an aspect of treatment of a single case study of an 
Asian-Indian immigrant in North America who was experiencing anxiety, low mood and 
difficulties adapting to the culture (Murrell et al., 2009).  In this case, the individual was 
able to imagine her negative thoughts as an object, although the defusion strategy was 
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only part of the overall ACT intervention.  This was a correlational study and it is 
uncertain exactly which aspects of the intervention were most helpful.  Murrell et al. 
(2009) advise the use of more controlled studies to examine this. 
 
A study by Forman, Hoffman et al. (2007) considered the use of an acceptance approach 
which included defusion strategies to manage cravings for food.  Both this approach and 
a control approach were found to help participants manage their cravings.  It was further 
found that those who had lower levels of craving benefitted most from the control 
strategies, while those who had higher levels of craving responded best with the 
acceptance approach although this difference was not significant.  Forman, Hoffman et 
al. (2007) thus suggested that individuals who are trying to lose weight but experience 
strong cravings for food are most likely to be helped by using an acceptance approach.  
This study used student participants and dieting status was not considered.  Thus it is not 
possible to generalise the results to a real life setting (Forman, Hoffman et al., 2007).  In 
addition to this, defusion strategies were used alongside the acceptance strategies and 
therefore, it is unclear which of these techniques contributed to the result. 
 
1.6 Defusion & Related Concepts 
As mentioned above, some of the ACT principles are considered to be mindfulness and 
acceptance processes.  ACT thus employs mindfulness as a way to get in touch with 
inner events and consider how they are influencing behaviour and whether this is 
consistent with chosen values (Harris, 2006).  Mindfulness is generally understood as 
the ability to be in the present moment without judging it.  Awareness of the utility of 
mindfulness in treating psychological difficulties has increased recently so that other 
therapies and interventions in addition to ACT also employ it as a treatment strategy 
(Carmody & Baer, 2007).  ACT and DBT are understood to use shorter mindfulness 




Defusion allows individuals to separate from their thoughts and adopt a more objective 
stance towards them (Yovel, 2009).  This type of definition is similar to some definitions 
of mindfulness which is also partly understood as the ability to distance oneself from 
inner events in order to be in touch with the present moment more fully (Dekeyser et al., 
2008).  Due to the similarity between these two concepts, it could be speculated that they 
are not fully distinct.  Brown and Ryan (2003) suggested that mindfulness helps 
individuals be aware of their automatic thoughts and behavioural responses and to 
separate from them.  It helps individuals consider their behaviour in terms of their needs 
and alter it accordingly.  This sounds very similar to defusion and the goals of ACT.  
Indeed, ACT uses mindfulness techniques as part of its intervention to reduce cognitive 
fusion, for example, the use of meditation to create a context where the usual verbal 
processes cannot function (Hayes & Shenk, 2004).  Further to this, Hayes and Shenk 
(2004) described defusion as “a mindfulness technique” (p.253) while mindfulness and 
defusion are believed to be absent when an individual is caught up in their thoughts 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
 
Scientific research of mindfulness is itself at an early stage (Hayes & Wilson, 2003), 
thus although the process of how mindfulness is believed to work can be stated, this 
needs to be corroborated with scientific study.  Indeed, uncertainty still exists around the 
exact definition of mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2004).  Brown and Ryan (2004) stated 
that in order to be able to measure mindfulness, it must be clearly described, although 
they suggested that mindfulness is a form of consciousness which is itself not fully 
understood.  In addition to this, Fletcher and Hayes (2005) emphasised that while 
mindfulness may not appear to be scientific, scientific processes are needed to describe 
and measure it.  This apparent contradiction may result in difficulties in measuring 
mindfulness.  These uncertainties around mindfulness could similarly be applied to 
cognitive defusion, although due to its links with RFT, cognitive defusion may be 
perceived as more scientific. 
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Perhaps another distinction between defusion and mindfulness regards the literality of 
language (Hayes & Shenk, 2004).  The defusion technique of repeating the same word 
over and over results in the removal of the word’s literal meaning.  This can detach the 
individual from language.  Therefore, it can be seen that defusion uses a variety of 
techniques, not just mindfulness ones.  Following from this, it may perhaps be correct to 
state that defusion enables mindfulness, as it provides a context for a mindful way of 
being, rather than defusion and mindfulness being the same concept (Fletcher & Hayes, 
2005). 
 
A similar argument may be applied to the apparent similarities between cognitive fusion 
and “believability” of thoughts (Healy et al., 2008, p.625).  If an individual has little 
belief in their thoughts, they are less likely to engage in experiential avoidance and their 
thoughts are less likely to drive their behaviour.  Thus it could be argued that 
believability and cognitive fusion refer to the same concept and defusion occurs when 
the individual has less belief in their thoughts.  In the study by Healy et al. (2008), the 
authors stated that they made no attempt to define defusion or how it operates, rather 
they aimed to consider how defusion techniques work.  Healy et al. (2008) thus 
indicated that defusion has yet to be fully defined by research.  It still remains unclear 
whether cognitive fusion and believability are distinct, however, it could be argued that 
fusion refers to more than belief in one’s thoughts.  Fusion is understood to refer also to 
how the individual identifies with their thoughts and gets caught up in them (Hayes et 
al., 1999). 
 
Healy et al. (2008) proposed that believability has to reduce in order for defusion to 
occur suggesting that lowered believability facilitates defusion and that one of the 
outcomes of defusion is a reduction in believability.  This is supported by Bach and 
Hayes (2002) and Fletcher and Hayes (2005) who both suggested that cognitive defusion 
results in lowered believability.  As will be discussed below, both Bach and Hayes 
(2002) and Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) reported a reduction in believability in 
psychotic symptoms after ACT interventions.  In order to measure fusion and defusion it 
26 
would appear to be important to distinguish between them and believability.  Healy et al. 
(2008) proposed that a change in believability suggests that defusion has occurred, 
however, they further stated that “the process of defusion itself remains obscure” 
(p.638).  In addition to this, they suggested that defusion can be measured by “assessing 
concurrent changes in discomfort, believability and willingness” (p.638).  However, this 
indicates that defusion itself is not being measured. 
 
Perhaps defusion can be distinguished from reduction in believability by the way in 
which it impacts upon this.  Defusion techniques aim to “change the functions of private 
experiences” (Fletcher & Hayes 2005, p.319) thus it is more than a change in 
believability.  RFT explains how this occurs as discussed above and perhaps the focus 
on the function of thoughts in addition to the inclusion of RFT allows for defusion to be 
distinguished from reductions in believability. 
 
A final concept which appears similar to defusion is decentring.  Decentring is described 
by Fresco, Segal et al. (2007) as “the capacity to take a present-focused, non-
judgemental stance in regard to thoughts and feelings and to accept them” (p.448).  
Further to this, decentring is understood to allow individuals to observe their inner 
events without getting caught up in them (Teasdale et al., 2002).  The similarity in these 
descriptions of decentring in comparison to cognitive defusion is startling and seems 
greater than any similarity defusion may share with mindfulness or believability.  
Further to this, Teasdale (1999) distinguished between “metacognitive knowledge” 
which is considered to be the experience of “thoughts as thoughts” and “metacognitive 
awareness” (p.147), where the process of thought is experienced.  Decentring is believed 
to increase metacognitive awareness.  Again this highlights the similarity between 
defusion and decentring and Teasdale (1999) emphasised that ACT was initially 
described as “comprehensive distancing” (p.153).  It is understood that the inability to 
decentre increases the risk of experiencing mental health problems again similar to the 
vulnerability posed in this respect by cognitive fusion. 
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Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) was developed by Segal et al. (2002) to 
target the recurring nature of depression and one of the main tools of this approach is 
decentring.  Similarities between MBCT and ACT may again be apparent as MBCT 
aims to weaken the links that occur between low mood and the unhelpful thinking 
processes and behaviours that occur when an individual is depressed (Teasdale et al., 
2000).  It does this through adopting a decentred approach which lowers experiential 
avoidance of inner events and allows the individual to consciously consider their 
behavioural responses.  This could be interpreted as a change in stimulus function and 
increased flexibility of response as encouraged by ACT and discussed above.  MBCT 
also encourages individuals to accept their inner events rather than try to change them 
(Fresco, Segal et al., 2007).  MBCT is most effective for individuals who have 
experienced at least three episodes of depression and it is believed that this is due to 
repeated episodes strengthening the links between low mood and unhelpful thinking 
processes (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). 
 
Teasdale et al. (2000) stated that one of the aims of MBCT is to encourage individuals to 
take a decentred approach towards the thoughts and feelings that are associated with 
their depression.  Perhaps this is a distinction between decentring and defusion, as 
defusion can be applied to any thoughts and feelings, not just those that are undesirable.  
However, although decentring may be targeted at inner events associated with 
depression, it does not necessarily follow that it cannot be used with other thoughts and 
feelings.  In addition to this and as mentioned above, Healy et al. (2008) found that a 
defusion technique had less influence upon positive self-statements as opposed to 
negative, suggesting that defusion is more effective with negative mental contents.  
Fresco, Moore et al. (2007) suggested that decentring was an aspect of CBT prior to the 
utilisation of mindfulness by many other approaches and they further stated that 
mindfulness is not equivalent to decentring.  Further clarity is required regarding the 




1.7 ACT for Mental Health Problems 
Following from the above discussions on cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance, 
psychological difficulties can be understood to involve these processes (Hayes & 
Wilson, 2003).  For example, the language used by individuals on a daily basis can 
result in the experience of uncomfortable inner events (Hayes et al., 2006).  Attempts to 
avoid these distressing inner experiences, such as fearful thoughts, can actually 
perpetuate these as illustrated above (Hofman & Asmundson, 2008).  The individual can 
then become caught up in this process, potentially exacerbating the experience of mental 
health problems. 
 
Avoidance is particularly common in individuals experiencing anxiety (Eifert et al., 
2009).  Individuals attempt to avoid their anxious thoughts and feelings and this often 
results in avoidance of situations which trigger anxiety.  Individuals then experience a 
short term reduction in anxiety symptoms but they persist long term.  Eifert et al. (2009) 
suggested that ACT allows individuals to consider the effects of trying to control their 
anxiety and how it can be counter-productive.  Individuals are then taught to sit with 
their anxiety, allow it to happen and consider it more objectively and mindfully.  They 
are encouraged to commit to behavioural change which is consistent with their values, 
despite the presence of their anxious symptoms.  The use of traditional behavioural 
strategies within ACT such as exposure, gives the individual the opportunity to 
experience their anxiety and change the way they respond to it (Eifert et al., 2009).  
Indeed, Hayes and Duckworth (2006) stated that exposure is advised by ACT not to 
reduce symptoms but to increase the individual’s range of responses to their symptoms.  
It is unclear, however, whether the benefits brought about by exposure are due to a 
reduction in symptoms or increased flexibility of response.  Eifert et al. (2009) reported 
three single case studies using ACT to treat various anxiety disorders.  All participants 
described a reduction in anxiety symptoms, although this is not an aim of ACT.  Two of 
the participants also felt more in control of their anxiety, although again, this is not the 
purpose of ACT, rather it occurs as a side effect (Eifert et al., 2009).  This study used 
self-reports to measure outcome and the individual cases were drawn from a larger 
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study.  The individual cases reported were chosen by each individual’s therapist which 
may have resulted in a positive bias. 
 
As discussed, ACT does not seek to increase control over inner events or to reduce their 
frequency or intensity (Hayes et al., 1999).  It is acknowledged, however, that this may 
occur through the process of ACT as a side effect.  Arch and Craske (2008) have 
speculated whether acceptance would continue to be so effective if such a “by product” 
(p.269) did not occur and they emphasised that further research is required to investigate 
this.  In addition to this, they suggested that predictability of inner events results from 
familiarity with them and the contexts in which they occur.  As the individual becomes 
more aware of the process of their thinking through ACT techniques, it is likely that they 
will become better able to predict the occurrence of their inner events (Arch & Craske, 
2008).  Again, predictability of inner events is not a specified goal of ACT (Fletcher & 
Hayes, 2005). 
 
The fact that ACT does not seek symptom change makes its therapeutic impact difficult 
to measure (Arch & Craske, 2008).  Indeed, it is unclear how outcome can be measured 
in ACT.  An individual can report that they are living more mindfully, that they are more 
accepting of their inner events and they have a more valued life, but it is unclear how 
this can be measured objectively.  It appears that outcome is likely to vary between 
individuals as different people have different values and different perceptions of what a 
valued life is.  Arch and Craske (2008) have speculated whether symptom reduction is 
inherently involved in a more valued life.  They proposed two possible relationships 
between a reduction in anxiety symptoms and a valued life.  It is possible that a 
reduction in anxiety symptoms may result in behavioural change that is more consistent 
with an individual’s values (Arch & Craske, 2008).  Alternatively, it is possible that 
behavioural change consistent with one’s values (for example, less avoidance) results in 
a reduction of anxiety.  It is unclear whether these relationships exist and Arch and 
Craske (2008) highlighted the possibility that one relationship occurs in ACT and 
another within CBT.  Again, further research is required to explore this. 
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The utility of ACT in treating psychosis has been considered by Bach and Hayes (2002).  
These authors suggested that individuals suffering from psychosis may also try to 
suppress and avoid their symptoms, resulting inadvertently in an increase of these 
experiences.  In this study, all patients were given treatment as usual, however, one 
group was provided with ACT in addition to this.  Bach and Hayes (2002) found that the 
rehospitalisation rate was reduced by fifty per cent for those who received the ACT 
intervention during the four months following treatment.  Both groups reported similar 
levels of frequency of symptoms and upset caused by these symptoms.  However, the 
patients receiving ACT reported less belief in their symptoms.  These positive results 
were not maintained, however, which the researchers suggested was due to the short 
length of the ACT intervention (four sessions) (Bach and Hayes, 2002).  They also 
found that ACT did not have a positive outcome for the patients who were delusional 
and denied their symptoms.  This study is also limited by the use of self-reports and the 
presence of co-morbid diagnoses and substance misuse.  Bach and Hayes (2002) 
highlighted that the participants in their study were more likely to be individuals 
suffering from chronic psychosis who had experienced previous episodes of 
hospitalisation. 
 
In a later study by Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) involving in-patients suffering from 
various psychiatric disorders, ACT was found to be superior to “enhanced” (p.418) 
treatment as usual in some areas of functioning.  Fewer patients who had received ACT 
were re-admitted to hospital in the four months following the study, although the 
researchers noted that this did not reach significance (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006).  
Interestingly, although both the experimental and control groups reported a reduction in 
frequency of hallucinations following each intervention, the group receiving ACT 
reported they were less troubled by their hallucinations and were significantly less likely 
to believe their hallucinations (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006).  Consistent with an ACT 
approach, Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) suggested that strength of belief in 
hallucinations should be the target of interventions, rather than the frequency by which 
hallucinations occur and this is also supported by the findings of Bach and Hayes (2002) 
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mentioned above.  Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) cautioned, however, that their study 
had a small sample and some of their results just fell into the significance range.  The 
majority of participants were African American males with little education.  In addition 
to this, the study was not blind and participants had a range of psychiatric diagnoses as 
well as physical health and substance misuse problems (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006).  
This may be a positive aspect of the study, however, as it is likely to reflect typical in-
patient settings (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006). 
 
ACT has not only been used to treat mental health problems but has also been found to 
help individuals manage physical pain (Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008).  Several studies have 
been carried out considering the role of acceptance in managing chronic pain 
(McCracken et al., 2007; McCracken & Zhao-O’Brien, 2010; McCracken & Eccleston, 
2003).  Some studies have also included a measure of activity related to values and how 
this is associated with pain (McCracken & Vowles, 2008).  These studies have generally 
found that acceptance and valued activity is connected with better functioning in a 
variety of areas.  However, samples in these studies tend to be less ethnically diverse, 
have greater amounts of women and tend to involve participants who are actively 
seeking treatment.  In addition to this, these studies are mostly correlational and used 
self-report measures.  A study by Vowles et al. (2008) carried out a mediational analysis 
on the role of acceptance in relation to catastrophic thinking and chronic pain.  This 
study found that acceptance partially mediated the relationship between this form of 
dysfunctional thinking and levels of “depression, pain-related fear and disability” 
(Vowles et al., 2008, p.S140).  Acceptance was found to be positively related with 
improved functioning.  It was not, however, found to mediate the relationship between 
catastrophic thinking and severity of pain. 
 
Two studies assessed the impact of an ACT intervention on functioning in individuals 
with chronic pain (McCracken et al., 2005; Vowles & McCracken, 2008).  Both studies 
found improvements in functioning following intervention.  Participants were not 
randomised to treatment condition, however, and further studies may benefit from this.   
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McCracken et al. (2005) acknowledged this but also emphasised that the “naturalistic” 
(p.1344) approach they took allows the results to be generalised to everyday clinic 
settings.  In addition to this, McCracken et al. (2005) stated that participants in their 
study were on a waiting list prior to intervention which allowed a comparison in 
functioning prior to and following treatment.  A further study by Páez-Blarrina et al. 
(2008) found that despite reporting similar levels of pain to a control group, individuals 
taught to use ACT were more likely to persist with a task which produced pain.  They 
suggested that this indicates “low believability of high pain” in the individuals using the 
ACT strategies (Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008, p.95).  This study was limited by a small 
student sample; however, it did assign participants randomly to experimental conditions 
and used both objective and subjective measures of outcome.  Similar to the approach 
with mental health problems, ACT encourages acceptance of symptoms in individuals 
suffering from chronic pain and aims to reduce the extent to which individuals are fused 
with their pain related thoughts while increasing value related activity (Hayes & 
Duckworth, 2006).  Using a single case experimental design, Twohig et al. (2006) also 
found four out of five individuals who engaged in skin picking reduced this behaviour to 
almost zero after an ACT intervention.  However, only one participant out of four who 
returned for follow up maintained their progress.  No control condition was used in this 
study. 
 
The use of ACT for couples has been considered by Peterson et al. (2009).  Both couples 
in this study reported increased marital satisfaction following an ACT intervention.  
“Interpersonal distress and overall psychological distress” were reported to have reduced 
(Peterson et al., 2009, p. 439).  Peterson et al. (2009) suggested that defusion and 
acceptance helped the participants to be more aware of the unhelpful behaviours they 
engaged in towards their partners and helped them consider alternative behavioural 
responses.  Smaller changes than expected were found in terms of “mindfulness, thought 
suppression and acceptance” (Peterson et al., 2009, p. 439) and the authors suggested 
this may have been due to the absence of mental health problems experienced by the 
participants involved in the study.  No controls were used in this study and outcome was 
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again measured by self-report.  In addition to this, Peterson et al. (2009) acknowledged 
that they did not measure how well therapists adhered to the treatment procedures. 
 
A study by Petersen and Zettle (2009) considered the ability of ACT to treat individuals 
who had co-morbid depression and alcohol misuse.  They suggested that these 
conditions can often co-occur and speculated that both may be the product of 
experiential avoidance, thus ACT was expected to be particularly effective in treating 
these conditions.  This study found that both ACT and treatment as usual had similar 
outcomes in reducing depression, however, Petersen and Zettle (2009) emphasised that 
both groups remained in treatment until they could be discharged.  Those who received 
the ACT intervention were able to be discharged at an earlier date and required less 
individual therapy.  Follow up of participants after discharge was not possible.  In 
addition to this, the sample size was small and consisted of individuals who were 
“involuntarily committed” to a substance misuse treatment centre which may have 
biased the results (Petersen & Zettle, 2009, p.524). 
 
ACT has also been found to be helpful in treating depression, OCD, substance misuse, 
social anxiety, PTSD, agoraphobia (Callaghan et al., 2004; Pull, 2008), epilepsy 
(Lundgren et al., 2008) and trichotillomania (Woods et al., 2006) while Masuda et al. 
(2007) found that ACT reduced the strength of stigmatising beliefs about mental health 
problems held by their participants.  In contrast, educating participants on mental health 
problems was not found to have a significant effect on the participants who were 
psychologically inflexible.  This study was limited, however by its use of a student 
sample who were given incentives to participate.  Outcome was measured by self report 
and Masuda et al. (2007) acknowledged that no conclusions could be drawn about which 
aspect of the intervention was producing the change. 
 
1.8 Methodological Concerns Regarding ACT Studies 
It has been emphasised by Öst (2008) that ACT studies have methodological limitations.  
Öst (2008) suggested that relatively few randomised controlled trials considering ACT 
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have been carried out.  In addition to this, Öst (2008) found in his meta-analysis that 
only half of all the ACT studies included used participants with a specific diagnosis.  Öst 
(2008) highlighted that studies in CBT and DBT frequently use participants with a 
specific diagnosis and cautioned that ACT studies are not as methodologically strong as 
studies in CBT in this respect.  Following from this, Gaudiano (2009) agreed with Öst 
(2008) that studies of ACT need to improve, however, Gaudiano stated that this has been 
proposed by ACT researchers themselves.  Gaudiano (2009) reported that it is difficult 
to match ACT and CBT studies as they use different populations who have different 
difficulties and of varying severity.  Gaudiano (2009) was critical of Öst’s (2008) own 
methodology and it should be noted that Öst (2008) developed his own measure of 
“methodological stringency” (p.313) in his study.  It is concluded by Gaudiano (2009) 
that ACT research is following a natural process and will mature with time. 
 
A later meta-analysis of ACT studies was carried out by Powers et al. (2009).  This 
meta-analysis involved studies which treated a variety of disorders (both physical and 
psychological) and used various outcome measures.  Powers et al. (2009) found that 
overall ACT was superior to control conditions at both end of treatment and follow up, 
although the control conditions tended to be treatment as usual.  They did not find that 
ACT had a significantly greater effect than a waiting list control condition for treating 
anxiety and depression.  Further to this, both overall and in relation to anxiety and 
depression, ACT was not significantly superior to other well known treatments such as 
CBT and cognitive therapy (Powers et al., 2009).  Powers et al. (2009) emphasised that 
the lack of a significant difference between treatments is not an uncommon finding and 
this is not unique to ACT. 
 
Pull (2008) suggested that more studies with a higher level of control and larger sample 
size are required.  In the above meta-analysis, Powers et al. (2009) found that ACT 
studies tend to use treatment as usual control conditions and suggested that more studies 
need to be carried out comparing ACT with other treatments.  Studies focusing on 
specific diagnoses are also encouraged by Powers et al. (2009).  It is still unclear exactly 
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how ACT works (Powers et al., 2009) while Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) highlighted 
that research into ACT tends to be carried out by its supporters which may bias results.  
Despite these limitations, Powers et al. (2009) recognised that ACT research is still at an 
early stage and suggested that initial results are promising and warrant further study. 
 
To try and address some of these concerns, Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) carried out a 
study to compare ACT with cognitive therapy (CT) for patients with symptoms of 
anxiety and depression (Forman, Herbert et al., 2007).  Trainee therapists with little or 
no ACT and CT experience were used to provide the therapy in this study in order to 
control for “allegiance effects” (Forman, Herbert et al., 2007, p.778).  These therapists 
also administered both therapies in this study.  Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) found no 
difference in outcome between the two treatments.  Both groups were found to have 
significant improvement with large effect sizes.  Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) suggested 
that these results indicate that ACT is as effective as CT.  They found that different 
mechanisms were at work in each therapy, consistent with the underlying theories, 
although emphasised that this aspect of the study was correlational.  Eighty per cent of 
the sample were women and no waiting list control group was used.  As the therapists 
administered both therapies, Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) stated that there was an 
“overlap in therapeutic technique” (p.793) between conditions which perhaps may 
explain why each treatment was equally effective. 
 
In a study of chronic pain, Vowles et al. (2009) compared the outcome of an ACT 
intervention with that of CBT.  Both treatments were found to have a positive impact 
upon functioning, however, the ACT approach produced better results on “measures of 
depression and pain-related anxiety” (p.55).  Contrary to expectations, levels of 
acceptance increased with both the ACT and CBT interventions which may suggest that 
a focus on acceptance is common to both these approaches.  It is important to note that 
this study was not randomised and that participants were free to persist with other 
treatments in which they were involved in addition to the experimental interventions.  
ACT was also compared with CBT by Hernádez-López et al. (2009) for its effectiveness 
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in aiding smoking cessation.  These researchers found that ACT was both “feasible” and 
“acceptable” to participants in a similar manner to CBT (Hernádez-López et al., 2009, 
p.728).  Those participating in the ACT intervention were also more likely to have 
maintained their progress at 12 month follow up compared to CBT.  This study had a 
fairly small sample size however, and participants were not randomised to treatment 
condition. 
 
A comparison of ACT with systematic desensitisation for maths anxiety was carried out 
by Zettle (2003).  This study found both interventions significantly lowered maths 
anxiety and this was maintained at follow up.  Zettle (2003) found, however, that 
although both interventions alleviated state anxiety, only systematic desensitisation 
significantly lowered trait anxiety.  It was further found that ACT produced the most 
positive change in individuals who engaged most in experiential avoidance (Zettle, 
2003).  This study used a small, mainly female sample of students and self-report 
measures.  Participants were, however, randomly assigned to the treatment conditions. 
 
1.9 ACT compared to CBT and Further Criticisms of ACT 
This naturally leads to a discussion on the potential similarities and differences between 
CBT and ACT.  As mentioned above, ACT has been compared most with CBT and the 
development of ACT is in part due to what the ACT developers see as potential 
limitations of CBT (Hayes, 2008).  CBT has been found to be useful for treating a 
variety of problems and difficulties and it is supported by research (Forman, Herbert et 
al., 2007; Arch & Craske, 2008).  It has been found to be better than waiting list controls 
and some other active treatments.  Indeed, Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) stated that 
cognitive therapy “is widely considered the current gold-standard psychotherapeutic 
approach, particularly for mood and anxiety disorders” (p.773).  However, while 
cognitive therapy has been found to alleviate a variety of psychological disorders, it is 
still unclear how it does this (Longmore & Worrell, 2007).  Although it is believed that 
change occurs during cognitive therapy due to changes in cognitions, this has yet to be 
established and indeed, has not been supported by research (Dimidjian, 2006; Longmore 
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& Worrell, 2007).  Hayes (2005) has suggested that CBT does not possess “an adequate 
basic account of cognition itself” (p.133).  This has led to further developments within 
the cognitive-behavioural field and resulted in the proposed third wave therapies.  As 
RFT provides an explanation of human language and cognition in behavioural terms it is 
believed that it is able to contribute understanding to human behaviour in general and to 
all forms of psychopathology (Hayes, 2005).  It is argued that the link between ACT and 
RFT enables the processes of ACT to be connected to theory and allows for the manner 
in which these processes are believed to operate to be tested scientifically (Hayes and 
Shenk, 2004). 
 
While some researchers may focus more on the differences between ACT and CBT, 
Hofman and Asmundson (2008) suggested that ACT builds upon CBT and uses some of 
the same techniques.  They also stated that CBT may use acceptance strategies.  From 
this perspective, ACT is not a new therapy and it does not, Hofman and Asmundson 
(2008) have argued, take the place of CBT.  Indeed, Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) 
highlighted that both therapies have a “grounding in empiricism and the emphasis on an 
active, collaborative, therapeutic relationship” (p.775).  The similarities between ACT 
and CBT have also been considered by Vowles et al. (2009) who emphasised their 
shared focus for lowering distress and improving daily functioning.  In addition to this, 
both therapies have stemmed from the behavioural tradition (Vowles et al., 2009).  
Hofman and Asmundson (2008) emphasised that ACT is still relatively new and 
research into it is still at an early stage, whereas CBT has been much more widely 
researched.  It may, therefore, be unfair to compare them (Gaudiano, 2009). 
 
Hofman and Asmundson (2008) suggested that comparisons between these two 
treatments are often the result of a lack of understanding of CBT and have described the 
ways in which CBT is often misunderstood.  Instead, they proposed that ACT and CBT 
can be distinguished by their focus, where “CBT techniques are primarily antecedent-
emotion focused, whereas ACT and other mindfulness approaches are primarily 
response-focused” (Hofman & Asmundson, 2008, p.2).  That is, CBT considers the 
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trigger that produces the distressing emotion while ACT focuses on how the individual 
responds to distressing mental contents.  This may seem a rather simplistic way of 
viewing ACT.  In a further illustration of this, Masuda et al. (2004) highlighted that 
CBT focuses on negative thoughts and how these produce negative emotions, physical 
symptoms and unhelpful behaviours.  CBT techniques aim to alter the content or 
strength of negative cognitions.  Conversely, ACT focuses on the way an individual 
relates to their thoughts and aims to increase their awareness of this process.  ACT is not 
the only therapy which has this focus; DBT and MBCT also work towards this (Masuda 
et al., 2004).  Ciarrochi and Robb (2005) suggest that the philosophies underlying CBT 
and ACT are quite distinct.  From this perspective, CBT is believed to use a more 
“mechanistic” method, looking at cause and effect of mental health difficulties within 
the individual (Ciarrochi et al., 2005, p.81).  While undergoing CBT, individuals are 
encouraged to test out hypotheses that they hold about themselves, others and the world 
to see if these are accurate interpretations of reality (Hofman & Asmundson, 2008).  
Conversely, the philosophy of ACT focuses on the function of difficulties within their 
context to understand why they occur and does not attempt to change inner events 
(Gillanders, in press).  This is supported by Vowles et al. (2009) who suggested that 
CBT focuses more on symptom reduction than ACT and CBT appears to imply that this 
must occur prior to behavioural change. 
 
One form of therapy within the CBT tradition, Rational and Emotional Behavioural 
Therapy (REBT) has been considered in detail in relation to ACT (Ellis, 2005).  Ellis 
(2005) suggested that like ACT, REBT also attends to language and how it influences 
cognition.  REBT is also proposed to promote acceptance of self, others and life in 
general and also encourages commitment to therapy, values and goals (Ellis, 2005).  As 
mentioned, one of the main differences between ACT and CBT is that ACT does not 
focus on the content of cognitions as it is believed that this encourages fusion with 
thoughts (Hayes et al., 1999).  It has been argued by Ellis (2005), however, that the 
process of therapy itself indirectly targets the content of cognitions.  Ellis (2005) 
suggested that a positive therapeutic relationship enables the individual to realise that the 
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therapist accepts them, thus this itself may challenge the content of their self-beliefs, for 
example, ‘I am worthless’.  Through the non-judgemental contact the individual has 
with their therapist, the content of this thought (and others like it) may be challenged, 
albeit indirectly (Ellis, 2005).  Ellis (2005) does agree, however, that ACT is unique in 
terms of its research into language and cognition.  Ellis (2005) appears to have argued 
that REBT includes ACT techniques, however, in addition to this, REBT encourages 
thought challenging.  In support of this, Ciarrochi and Robb (2005) suggested that while 
ACT involves acceptance, REBT involves both “acceptance and change” (p.123).  
Ciarrochi et al. (2005) stated that REBT aims to challenge unhelpful beliefs as these can 
often be related to avoidance.  In their study, Ciarrochi et al. (2005) found that measures 
of ACT and REBT were positively related, which they suggested indicates these are 
similar constructs. 
 
Consistent with this, Ciarrochi and Robb (2005) proposed that cognitive reframing may 
help the individual become aware of their thoughts and the impact their thoughts have 
on their behaviour, a process which, they argued, is consistent with ACT.  Ciarrochi and 
Robb (2005) suggested that cognitive reframing does not necessarily result in increased 
fusion as ACT researchers have proposed.  This is supported by Arch and Craske (2008) 
who suggested that cognitive challenging is not the same as thought suppression and 
challenging can result in less severe symptoms.  Arch and Craske (2008) have also 
advised that challenging encourages the individual to focus on thoughts which were 
previously avoided.  In addition to this, a study by Westin et al. (2008) found that 
acceptance of tinnitus symptoms did not result in a significant difference in performance 
on an imagery task compared to participants asked to suppress thoughts related to their 
symptoms.  This suggests that thought suppression may not always have negative results 
(Westin et al., 2008). 
 
Similarly, Ciarrochi and Robb (2005) highlighted that ACT does not state that cognitive 
challenging should never be carried out and suggested that the reasons as to why ACT 
does not encourage challenging need to be investigated.  They proposed that like ACT, 
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REBT provides a context whereby individuals can become aware that their thoughts are 
not literally true, although REBT achieves this through cognitive challenging (Ciarrochi 
& Robb, 2005).  The ability to see that thoughts are not literally true results in distancing 
from cognitions which is, Arch and Craske (2008) have argued, a form of cognitive 
defusion.  Through cognitive challenging, REBT reduces the impact that thoughts can 
have upon behaviour which again appears consistent with the general theory of ACT.  
Further to this, Fresco, Segal et al. (2007) found that depressed individuals undergoing 
CBT achieved greater levels of decentring than those treated with anti-depressant 
medication while Ciarrochi and Robb (2005) stated that content and context of 
cognitions are linked and that by considering the content of their thoughts, individuals 
are more aware of what they are avoiding.  Changing the content of thoughts may also 
change the context so that individuals no longer see their thoughts as literally true 
(Ciarrochi & Robb, 2005). 
 
While Hayes (2005) has agreed that REBT is the form of CBT that ACT is most 
consistent with, he resisted suggestions that ACT is merely an extension to the CBT 
approach and proposed that ACT is “fundamentally different from much of what has 
gone before in the behavioural and cognitive therapies” (p.132).  Hayes (2005) 
suggested that CBT is largely a theory of cognition not language, whereas ACT 
incorporates both of these.  Hayes (2005) further suggested that the links between CBT 
and cognitive theory have not been supported.  From the many studies carried out on 
CBT, it is clear that it is effective in alleviating distress, however, it has yet to be 
demonstrated how CBT operates (Hayes, 2005).  In support of this, McCracken et al. 
(2005) stated that CBT is known to be effective for treating chronic pain, however, the 
specific “treatment components” (p.1344) that produce the positive results have not been 
established.  Arch and Craske (2008) also emphasised that although many studies have 
been carried out regarding CBT, very few have considered how CBT works “using 
formal mediational analyses” (p.273).  Hayes (2005) has suggested that RFT provides an 




Ciarrochi et al. (2005) and Ciarrochi and Robb (2005) have advised that REBT and ACT 
can be integrated as above.  However, they suggested that some change has to occur 
within REBT to accomplish this.  It is proposed by Hayes (2005) that the fact REBT has 
to change to incorporate ACT indicates that ACT is bringing something new.  Further to 
this, Hayes (2005) has agreed that beliefs can often be unhelpful but suggested that it 
does not then simply follow that the most helpful approach is to challenge or change the 
beliefs.  Hayes (2005) suggested that cognitive challenging keeps the thought active and 
may reinforce it and the function it serves.  In addition to this, ACT techniques can be 
applied to all inner events and not just cognitions (Hayes 2005). 
 
Longmore and Worrell (2007) have reviewed the evidence for cognitive challenging and 
found that while cognitive therapy can be effective, it is no more effective than 
behavioural interventions.  Adding a cognitive component to a behavioural treatment has 
not been found to have a greater effect on outcome (Longmore & Worrell, 2007).  
Indeed, Dimidjian et al. (2006) found that a behavioural activation intervention was 
superior to cognitive therapy for individuals with more severe levels of depression.  In 
this study, behavioural activation was found to produce similar results to antidepressant 
medication (Dimidjian et al., 2006).  Longmore and Worrell (2007) have also suggested 
that no causal link has been found between cognitive techniques and changes in 
cognitions.  In response to these studies, Arch and Craske (2008) have proposed that 
cognitive challenging may be a type of exposure which may explain why CBT and 
behavioural interventions have similar outcomes.  Jarrett et al. (2007) found in their 
study that “changes in negative cognitive content were accounted for by changes in 
depressive symptoms rather than vice versa” (p.443).  This may indicate that there is a 
relationship between cognition and mood but it is yet to be fully understood and it may 
not operate in the manner which cognitive therapists believe.  It has also been suggested 
by Hayes (2005) that therapeutic change occurs prior to the use of cognitive techniques, 
although Longmore and Worrell (2007) found no evidence to support this. 
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Given that CBT precedes ACT, has been widely researched and has been the treatment 
of choice for a significant time period, it is only natural that comparisons are drawn 
between them.  When describing ACT, researchers often do so by comparing how it is 
different to CBT and identifying potential weaknesses of CBT.  This may at times result 
in a competitive air between CBT and ACT followers.  It is impossible to escape the 
inevitable comparisons, however, it would be unfortunate if this did not amount to more 
than a clamour for the position of most effective intervention.  Indeed, Hayes (2008) 
stated that identifying weaknesses in one therapy does not then mean another therapy 
which does not have these weaknesses is better.  Hayes (2008) emphasised the need for 
each therapy to develop independently of others. 
 
As referred to above and from an alternative viewpoint, it is suggested by Arch and 
Craske (2008) that commonalities between therapies need to be considered as this helps 
to identify how each therapy is operating and will also allow for behavioural therapies to 
progress in general.  They proposed that while on a superficial level, CBT and ACT 
appear quite different, they may share similarities at a more fundamental level.  Similar 
to some of the arguments above, Arch and Craske (2008) highlighted that both CBT and 
ACT encourage individuals to take on a more “objective” (p.265) approach to their inner 
events although they may do this in different ways.  Both techniques also provide the 
individual with skills and tools to manage their inner events.  This is emphasised by 
Hofman and Asmundson (2008) who describe both CBT and ACT as “problem focused” 
(p.11). 
  
From the perspective of functional analytic psychotherapy, Callaghan et al. (2004) 
suggested that ACT places little significance on an individual’s relationships.  Callaghan 
et al. (2004) stated that “ACT focuses specifically on the emotional experience of the 
client with less consideration of the interpersonal context in which the feeling occurs” 
(p.201).  It is highlighted by Callaghan et al. (2004) that an inability to accept their 
emotions may occur due to an individual’s experience of relationships where the 
expression of emotion was not tolerated.  Callaghan et al. (2004) have promoted a more 
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interpersonal approach where the therapeutic relationship is used as the vehicle for 
change.  Through this approach, therapists are encouraged to respond to patients’ 
behaviour as it happens in session and use behavioural principles to encourage helpful 
behaviour and reduce dysfunctional behaviour. 
 
While ACT helps reduce experiential avoidance, Callaghan et al. (2004) suggested that 
it does not help with the development of social relationships.  It is emphasised by 
Callaghan et al. (2004) that although ACT considers the verbal nature of human beings, 
humans are also inherently social which seems to be given less importance by ACT.  
Indeed, Callaghan et al. (2004) have drawn attention to the fact that inner events “occur 
in the context of other people” (p.202).  It could be argued, however, that the 
consideration of functional contextualism within ACT includes a focus on interpersonal 
relationships as Hayes et al. (2006) have stated that “contextualism views psychological 
events as ongoing actions of the whole organism interacting in and with historically and 
situationally defined contexts” (p.4).  It is possible that context includes the social 
relationships an individual is engaged in. 
 
Baruch et al. (2009) have also emphasised the importance of the therapeutic relationship 
in ACT.  The therapist facilitates the patient in reducing experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion by helping them to change the context of inner events.  Baruch et al. 
(2009) suggested that while this work results in ACT having a more “intrapersonal” 
focus, the outcomes are frequently “interpersonal” (p.243).  ACT allows individuals to 
consider the values by which they wish to live their lives – it is possible and indeed 
likely, that individuals may include elements of social relationships within their values 
(Hayes et al., 1999).  This is illustrated by Baruch et al. (2009) who stated that “ACT 
does not encourage acceptance of hallucinations or delusions for its own sake, but such 
acceptance is encouraged in order for the client to act according to a value, such as 
asking a woman to dinner, reconnecting with one’s family and so forth” (p.243).  The 
fact that the study carried out by Petersen et al. (2009) considered an ACT intervention 
for couples also suggests that ACT takes account of relationships. 
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As discussed above, ACT and RFT have identified the problematic nature of language in 
increasing and maintaining experiential avoidance.  Despite this, Arch and Craske 
(2008) highlighted the paradox that language is required for defusion and acceptance.  
The methods that ACT uses will require “self-talk in the form of verbal coaching” (Arch 
& Craske, 2008, p. 267).  These authors continued to suggest that a focus on defusing 
thoughts that are inconsistent with values still results in the use of language 
categorisation and a focus on thought content which ACT seeks to avoid.  Hayes et al. 
(1999) have emphasised that defusion can be used for all thoughts not just those which 
are inconsistent with values.  They have also proposed that language itself and the ways 
in which it is used are not necessarily negative, rather that the reliance on verbal means 
to solve problems and the use of control strategies to alleviate unpleasant feelings are 
unlikely to allow the individual to change their behaviour in line with their values 
(Hayes et al., 1999).  Indeed, Hayes et al. (1999) suggested that the ACT model itself is 
to be “held lightly” (p.281) in order that individuals do not become caught up in the 
verbal aspects of it. 
 
1.10 Development of a Cognitive Fusion Measure 
Following from the above discussions, it is as yet unclear exactly how ACT operates.  
The theory behind it goes some way to explaining this, however, theory must be 
validated by research (Hayes et al., 1987).  In order for the process of ACT to be clearer 
and to identify the contribution that each component makes during treatment, it must be 
possible to measure each aspect individually (Hayes, 2008; Arch & Craske, 2008).  
Indeed, Peterson et al. (2009) stated that “future efforts to develop a scale to measure 
cognitive defusion seems increasingly important given the powerful nature and central 
focus of this construct” (p.439).  The isolation of defusion would also allow 
consideration of how it relates to thought challenging and whether these two processes 
are similar (Arch & Craske, 2008).  In addition to this, it would allow for defusion to be 
compared with mindfulness, believability and decentring as discussed above.  It would 
also allow a more objective measure of ACT interventions and help identify the 
processes of change in this model.  Towards this end, a measure of cognitive fusion has 
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been initially developed and validated as part of a thesis project at the University of 
Edinburgh (Dempster, 2009).  Known as the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ), this 
measure is a 13 item questionnaire.  Development of the CFQ is still at an early stage 
and it is unclear whether it is a reliable measure.  One aspect of reliability concerns 
whether a measure yields the same results consistently over time, known as test re-test 
reliability (Barker et al., 2002).  Test-retest reliability minimises the amount of error 
reported in test scores as it is expected that scores will remain constant over a short 
period of time.  Whether the CFQ can demonstrate test-retest reliability is still unknown. 
 
Following from this, it is hoped that the CFQ will eventually be able to be used within a 
clinical population to measure change during and after psychological intervention 
(Dempster, 2009).  This will enable cognitive fusion to be isolated and allow it to be 
measured.  If the CFQ were unreliable, it would not be able to do this or consider 
whether a relationship exists between change in cognitive fusion and change in 
symptoms and behaviour after psychological intervention (Barker et al., 2002).  Hesser 
(2009) has encouraged more research to consider the extent to which individuals engage 
in acceptance and cognitive defusion prior to psychological intervention in addition to 
the presence of these behaviours in session.  Barker et al. (2002) stated that test-retest 
reliability “is the most appropriate type of reliability when you are considering change 
over time” (p.61), however, they cautioned that very high reliability is not desirable as 
this would suggest that the measure is not sensitive to genuine change.  Indeed, in 
developing the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ), Hayes et al. (2004) found 
it had test-retest reliability of r = .64 across a four month period.  Hayes et al. (2004) 
suggested that if this form of reliability was very high, it would not be consistent with 
ACT’s understanding of experiential avoidance which tends to vary.  In the current 
study, it was decided that participants would be invited to complete the CFQ on two 
occasions, one month apart, in order to provide a measure of test-retest reliability. 
 
Reliability does not, however, establish whether a measure is valid (Barker et al., 2002) 
and there are various forms of validity.  Haynes et al. (1995) described validity as “the 
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degree to which elements of an assessment instrument are relevant to and representative 
of the targeted construct for a particular assessment purpose” (p.238).  In terms of the 
CFQ, the targeted construct is cognitive fusion.  For a measure to be valid it needs to 
correlate with other measures which assess similar constructs (convergent validity) 
(Barker et al., 2002).  Related to this, Fletcher and Hayes (2005) stated that mindfulness 
has a long history and has been incorporated into a variety of therapies including ACT.  
As discussed above, mindfulness can be used as a technique to encourage cognitive 
defusion, allowing an individual to step back from their thoughts and view them more 
objectively (Hayes et al., 2006).  It would, therefore, seem likely that individuals who 
experienced less cognitive fusion will also experience greater levels of mindfulness. 
 
A measure of cognitive fusion would thus be expected to correlate negatively with a 
measure of mindfulness.  This has already been initially considered by Dempster (2009) 
who found that the CFQ correlated with the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire, a 
measure of “mindful awareness of distressing thoughts and images” (Chadwick et al., 
2008, p.451).  This indicates that the CFQ has construct validity.  Dempster (2009) 
cautioned, however, that the SMQ was developed to consider mindful responses to 
psychotic symptoms and it was also found to have a single factor structure (Chadwick et 
al., 2008).  Other researchers (Baer et al., 2006) consider mindfulness to be 
“multifaceted” (p.42) and various measures have been developed to measure the various 
components of mindfulness.  It was recommended by Dempster (2009) that the CFQ be 
measured in relation to one of these measures.  The Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ) has been developed by Baer et al. (2006) and is a development 
from the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS) (Baer et al., 2004).  
Considering how the CFQ relates to the FFMQ may further identify the relationship 
between defusion and mindfulness. 
 
Dempster (2009) also found that the CFQ negatively correlated with a measure of life 
satisfaction.  As discussed above, cognitive fusion is believed to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of mental health problems (Hayes et al., 1999).  It is 
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likely, therefore, that cognitive fusion will be related to symptoms of anxiety and 
depression.  This could be tested by comparing scores on the CFQ against scores on a 
measure of anxiety and depression symptoms.  One such measure is the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  Following from this, 
several researchers have emphasised the importance of mediation analysis to identify the 
specific elements of therapy which are producing change (Arch & Craske, 2008; 
Lundgren et al., 2008, Vowles et al., 2008).  Mediational analysis of the CFQ in relation 
to anxiety and depression scores over time would therefore be useful to identify whether 
cognitive fusion is involved in mental health symptoms.  It was decided that in addition 
to completing the CFQ on two occasions, participants would be asked to fill in the 
HADS twice too.  If cognitive fusion is involved in anxiety and depression, it would be 
expected that CFQ scores would influence the relationship between anxiety and 
depression scores at testing time one and testing time two. 
 
Dempster (2009) also considered how the CFQ correlated with a measure of experiential 
avoidance, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, second version (AAQ-II) (Bond et 
al., submitted).  These two questionnaires were found by Dempster (2009) to have a 
strong positive correlation (r = .65).  Given the strength of this relationship, further 
assessment would be useful as Dempster (2009) queried whether this may indicate too 
much “overlap” (p.127) between these measures. 
 
Part of ensuring a questionnaire’s validity means establishing that it is not influenced by 
the effects of social desirability (Leite & Beretvas, 2005) and this relates to discriminant 
validity (Barker et al., 2002).  One of the ways in which to identify whether a measure is 
immune to the effects of social desirability, is to compare it with a questionnaire which 
considers this concept.  The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
(Paulhus, 1991) is one such questionnaire and it was developed in response to the 
finding that social desirability is not a single construct (Stöber et al., 2002).  It was 
decided to include this measure in the current study to consider whether the CFQ is 
influenced by social desirability. 
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The CFQ was initially developed as a 28 item questionnaire.  Dempster (2009) carried 
out an exploratory factor analysis of the CFQ using a mixed student and community 
sample which found that it could be reduced to 15 items given the factor structure.  A 
two factor structure was found which suggests that the CFQ is measuring cognitive 
fusion and defusion (Dempster, 2009).  Breckler (1990) has emphasised that it is 
inadvisable to use the same sample for both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
of a model, therefore, carrying out a confirmatory factor analysis with a new sample 
would be beneficial.  Further meetings between the developers of the CFQ resulted in 
the CFQ being reduced to 13 items while still maintaining internal consistency 
(Gillanders, personal correspondence, 14 June 2010).  Four of the question items are 
worded in the opposite direction to reduce response bias and are thus scored in reverse.  
Further analysis by the CFQ developers has also found that a two factor structure may 
have been in part due to method variance caused by the reversed direction of responding 
on some of the items (Gillanders, personal correspondence, 14 June 2010).  From this, it 
was decided that the CFQ would be scored as a one factor measure of cognitive fusion.  
A confirmatory factor analysis would also benefit this research. 
 
1.11 Utility of Questionnaires 
The use of self-report questionnaires is much debated within the literature.  Positive 
aspects of self-reports are that they allow access to an individual’s inner world (Barker 
et al., 2002).  Cognitive fusion is not directly observable and the use of a self-report may 
provide some insight into an individual’s internal experiences.  Written questionnaires 
also allow the individual to complete them in their own time and aid confidentiality 
(Barker et al., 2002).  Questionnaires, therefore, can be useful and Greco et al. (2008) 
highlighted that they are “convenient and cost-effective” (p.94).  They are also quick to 
use.  Self-reports are not, however, fully objective.  They can be open to the effects of 
social desirability (Barker et al., 2002), although as discussed, this can be addressed by 
comparing them with measures of this construct. 
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Like cognitive fusion, mindfulness may also be a difficult construct to measure by self-
report.  Van Dam et al. (2009) considered the FFMQ and suggested that some items of 
this questionnaire “function differently” (p.516) for those who meditate compared to 
those who do not.  They suggest that the FFMQ may not identify individuals who are 
more mindful, rather it may indicate those who are more aware that their attention has 
wandered.  Van Dam et al. (2009) highlighted the difficulty that measures of 
mindfulness have when used with individuals who have less awareness and stated that 
“trying to re-represent an experience one was potentially unaware of in the first place 
likely increases error and bias” (p.516).  Further to this, Van Dam et al. (2009) found 
that while individuals who meditated scored more highly on the FFMQ, those who did 
not meditate but had some knowledge of mindfulness also had higher scores than those 
without this knowledge.  This suggests that an understanding of a construct may increase 
scores without individuals necessarily displaying higher levels of that construct.  While 
this argument is directed towards mindfulness, it may equally apply to measures of 
cognitive fusion.  As discussed above, cognitive fusion occurs when changes occur in 
the functions of thoughts in controlling behaviour.  It is likely, however, that individuals 
will lack awareness of this process as it becomes largely automatic (Hayes et al., 1999). 
 
Wicksell et al. (2008) stated that “measuring ….. cognitive fusion with a self-report 
questionnaire is difficult and other types of assessment may be useful” (p.497).  Related 
to this, Hayes et al. (2004) suggested that as experiential avoidance varies across settings 
it may be difficult to measure reliably and it could be argued that the same is true of 
cognitive fusion.  Hayes et al. (2004) have stressed that the use of questionnaires to 
measure experiential avoidance is still questionable.  They state that “the contextual 
behavioural nature of experiential avoidance and its multiple features do not fully fit 
psychometric assumptions” (Hayes et al., 2004, p.572).  This argument could also be 
applied to the use of a questionnaire to measure cognitive fusion which is also likely to 
fluctuate over time and will be influenced by the context an individual is in.  Hayes et al. 
(2004) have stated, however, that questionnaires to measure experiential avoidance can 
be useful as they can guide further research and tool development and that a variety of 
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approaches may be required for assessment of this construct.  Therefore, although a self-
report questionnaire may not provide a full measure of cognitive fusion, it may still 
contribute some understanding of this construct. 
 
1.12 Aims of the Current Study 
The CFQ has been developed to isolate cognitive fusion from the ACT model and 
consider its unique contribution to psychological change.  Before this measure can be 
used in this manner, it will be important to establish whether it is reliable and valid, 
whether it is influenced by social desirability and if it is distinct from other 
psychological concepts as discussed.  The following aims were thus identified for the 
current study: 
 
1. To consider whether the CFQ relates to a multi-faceted measure of mindfulness.  
It is hypothesised that the CFQ will correlate negatively with such a measure. 
  
2. To establish whether the CFQ continues to positively correlate with the AAQ-II.  
It is hypothesised that the CFQ will positively correlate with this measure. 
 
3. To establish whether the CFQ is influenced by social desirability.  It is 
hypothesised that the CFQ will not correlate with a measure of social 
desirability. 
 
4. To assess the test-retest reliability of the CFQ.  It is hypothesised that the CFQ 
will demonstrate good reliability in this respect. 
 
5. To consider how the CFQ relates to symptoms of anxiety and depression.  It is 
hypothesised that the CFQ will correlate positively with a questionnaire 
measuring these symptoms.  In addition to this, it is further hypothesised that 
CFQ scores will mediate the relationship between anxiety and depression 
symptoms at time one and time two. 
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6. To carry out a confirmatory factor analysis of the CFQ following from the 
exploratory factor analysis completed by Dempster (2009).  It is hypothesised 






2.1 Sample Size Calculations 
Dempster (2009) found a large correlation (r = -.79) between the CFQ and a measure of 
mindfulness.  A large correlation was also found by Dempster (2009) between the CFQ 
and the AAQ-II, a measure of experiential avoidance (r = .65).  It was, therefore, 
expected in the current study that these moderate to large relationships between the CFQ 
and measures of mindfulness and experiential avoidance would persist.  In addition to 
this, it was expected that the CFQ would correlate strongly between testing time one and 
two.  Cohen (1992) advised that for the purpose of correlations, a sample of 28 is 
required where the effect size is expected to be large and a sample of 85 is required 
where the effect size is expected to be moderate.  In the current studies, therefore, a 
sample size of 60 was aimed for to detect a moderate to large effect.  The CFQ has not 
been measured in relation to social desirability, therefore, the existence of a relationship 
between cognitive fusion and social desirability and its size is unknown.  A larger 
sample would thus be required to measure the CFQ in relation to a measure of social 
desirability.  For the factor analysis, one perspective suggests that there is a requirement 
of 10 participants for each questionnaire item (Schreiber et al., 2006).  The CFQ has 13 
items thus requiring a sample of 130 for a confirmatory factor analysis to be completed.  
There is uncertainty about the recommended number of participants for confirmatory 
factor analysis and other researchers have recommended a minimum of 200 (Marsh et 
al., 1988).  Shevlin and Miles (1998) have also suggested that whether sample size 
affects the results is influenced by the scale of the factor loadings and also whether the 
models have been defined or are “misspecified” (p.88). 
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2.2 Study One – Validity of the CFQ 
Study one focussed on the validity of the CFQ. 
  
2.2.1 Participants 
There were 47 individuals in study one, 24 males and 23 females after one participant 
was excluded due to missing data (this will be discussed below).  Male participants thus 
constituted 51 per cent of the sample while 49 per cent of the sample was female and 40 
of these individuals had some form of further education.  The ages of participants ranged 
from 21 to 73 and the mean age was 35 (SD = 11.54). 
 
2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria 
Participants were required to be adults (age 18 and over) whose first language was 
English.  This would ensure that participants were fluent in reading English and thus 
able to comprehend the CFQ and other measures included.  One participant was 
excluded due to missing responses on the CFQ.  One participant was excluded from the 
analysis considering the relationship between the CFQ and the AAQ-II due to missing 
responses in the AAQ-II.  One participant was also excluded from the correlational 
analysis between the CFQ and the BIDR due to missing responses in the BIDR.  How 
missing data was handled will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
2.2.3 Measures 
Study one used the following measures. 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
Participants were requested to record their age, gender, and highest level of education.  
This was to ensure a good representation of the general population was achieved.  
Participants were also requested to provide their email address if they consented to 
participating on a second occasion for study two (details below).  In addition to this, 
participants were informed that one of the questionnaires was a screening measure for 
symptoms of anxiety and depression but it was not a diagnostic measure (the Hospital 
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Anxiety and Depression Scale).  Participants were asked to indicate by ticking a box if 
they wished to be informed if they scored highly on this measure.  They were advised 
that they would be contacted after the second testing occasion. 
 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire 
The Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ) is a 13 item questionnaire rated on a 7 point 
scale and measures cognitive fusion and defusion.  Four of the CFQ items are worded in 
a way to minimise response bias and are reverse scored.  It was initially developed by 
Dempster (2009) who advised that high scores on this measure denote cognitive fusion 
and reported internal consistency on this measure of 0.88.  Dempster (2009) initially 
proposed 44 items to encompass cognitive fusion and these items were rated by an 
expert panel of ACT clinicians and researchers.  Through exploratory factor analyses, 
the number of items was reduced to 15 by Dempster (2009) and then reduced to 13 as 
mentioned in the introduction section (Gillanders, personal correspondence, 14 June 
2010).  A two factor model was found by Dempster (2009) to be the best fit for this 
measure and Dempster (2009) obtained results supportive of the convergent validity of 
the CFQ.  The CFQ can be seen in Appendix A 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) is a 14 item multiple choice 
questionnaire which screens for symptoms of anxiety and depression but is not a 
diagnostic tool (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  It was initially developed for use with 
patients hospitalised with physical health conditions, however, it is now often used to 
screen for anxiety and depression symptoms in the general population (Dunbar et al., 
2000).  The HADS uses a self-report format, is quick and easy to use and is found to be 
“acceptable” to patients (Herrmann, 1997, p.18).  In their literature review of studies 
assessing the HADS, Bjelland et al. (2002) reported that in general such studies support 
the ability of the HADS to identify clinical cases of anxiety and depression and it has 
adequate concurrent validity.  Conversely, Dunbar et al. (2000) suggested that while 
some studies are supportive of the HADS ability to detect clinical cases, others indicate 
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the HADS may identify “too many false positives” (p.79).  The HADS is also believed 
to have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Johnston et al., 2000), 
however, there is still debate about the factor structure of the HADS (McCue et al., 
2006) and there is some variability of scores depending on gender (Nortvedt et al. 2006).  
The two subscales of the HADS have also been found to correlate with other measures 
of anxiety and depression (Herrmann, 1997).  The HADS can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire 
This is a multi-faceted measure of mindfulness developed by Baer et al. (2006) and 
consists of 39 items rated on a 5 point scale.  Baer et al. (2006) developed this measure 
from an earlier measure of mindfulness, the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
(KIMS) (Baer et al., 2004).  The KIMS had four components of mindfulness, however, 
when considering the KIMS with other measures of mindfulness, Baer et al. (2004) 
found through exploratory factor analysis that the measures studied appeared to be 
representing five facets.  The five factor structure and the construct validity of the 
FFMQ were supported in a study by Baer et al. (2008).  The KIMS was found to have 
good internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Baer et al., 2004) while the five 
facets which the FFMQ incorporates were also found to have good internal consistency 
(Baer et al., 2006). 
 
The five facets are termed “observe”, “describe”, “act with awareness”, “non-judge” and 
“non-react” (Baer et al., 2008, p.330).  The observe facet refers to the ability to consider 
inner and external events, while the describe facet concerns the ability to describe inner 
events with words (Baer et al., 2008).  The act with awareness facet involves an 
individual considering their actions in the present moment, rather than acting 
automatically.  The non-judge facet refers to the ability to respond to inner events in a 
manner which is non-evaluative, while the non-react facet concerns the ability to allow 
inner events to happen without needing to respond to them (Baer et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) found in their study that changes in the 
observe and describe facets of the KIMS were most related to CT outcome, while 
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changes in the act with awareness and acceptance facets of the KIMS in addition to 
change in experiential avoidance were most related to the ACT intervention outcome. 
 
Baer et al. (2008) reported results supportive of the construct validity of the FFMQ.  As 
would be expected for a measure of mindfulness, Van Dam et al. (2009) found that 
individuals who meditated scored more highly on the FFMQ and scores also increased 
with greater amounts of meditation.  However, Van Dam et al. (2009) also cautioned 
that scores on the FFMQ may increase with greater knowledge of mindfulness in the 
absence of mindfulness practice.  The FFMQ can be seen in Appendix C. 
 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version six (BIDR) was developed by 
Paulhus (1991) as a measure of social desirability.  A seventh version has been 
published, however, Stöber et al. (2002) have stated that version six is used most often.  
The BIDR is a 40 item measure rated on a 7 point scale.  It is described by Paulhus 
(1991) as having good internal consistency and correlates appropriately with other 
measures of social desirability.  Paulhus (1991) reported that measure of social 
desirability did not always correlate highly with each other and factor analysis of these 
measures identified the presence of two main factors.  Unlike other measures which 
consider social desirability to be a single construct, the BIDR measure was developed to 
incorporate two aspects of this construct, impression management and self-deception 
(Paulhus, 1991).  This enables new measures to be considered in relation to each 
component of social desirability separately.  Impression management is described by 
Paulhus (1991) as being a more conscious process to appear more desirable.  
Alternatively, self-deception is understood to occur outside conscious awareness and be 
more stable over time (Paulhus, 1991).  Self-deception is described by Paulhus (1991) as 
the “tendency to give self-reports that are honest but positively biased” (p.37).  It is 




Leite and Beretvas (2005) suggested that there is a lack of clarity regarding social 
desirability and its factor structure.  They found that the BIDR did not fit a two factor 
model, although the self-deception subscale did fit a one factor model as would be 
expected.  This is contrary to the results found by Kroner and Weekes (1996) who used 
an offender population and found that although two factors were found generally, the 
self-deception subscale split into two factors.  The different populations may explain 
these varying results.  Leite and Beretvas (2005) have suggested that measures of social 
desirability still need to be validated themselves and apply this to other such measures, 
not solely the BIDR.  The BIDR may be scored in a continuous manner where the score 
for each item is counted (Stöber et al., 2002).  Alternatively, the BIDR can be scored in 
a dichotomous manner whereby only extreme scores are counted (Stöber et al., 2002).  
Stöber et al. (2002) has recommended the use of the continuous scoring method.  In their 
studies, Stöber et al. (2002) found that the continuous method yielded scores with higher 
internal reliability and were more likely to correlate with other social desirability 
questionnaires, therefore, this method was used in the current study.  The BIDR can be 
seen in Appendix D. 
 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, second version (AAQ-II) was developed by 
Bond et al. (submitted) as a revision of the original version developed by Hayes et al. 
(2004).  It is a 10 item measure of experiential avoidance and the first version was 
demonstrated to have “acceptable” internal consistency (Hayes et al., 2004, p.572).  
High scores on this measure are indicative of high experiential avoidance.  The first 
version was developed using both a clinical and community sample.  The AAQ-II is 
quick to use, appears acceptable to participants and has face validity (Kortte et al., 
2009).  Kortte et al. (2009) have queried the factor structure of the AAQ-II as they found 
a two factor structure as opposed to the one factor structure expected.  It is possible that 
this is due to the “medical rehabilitation” sample used by Kortte et al. (2009, p.92) in 
their study.  Conversely, the single factor structure was supported by McCracken and 
Zhao-O’Brien’s (2010) study, although this was using a sample of individuals with 
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chronic pain.  McCracken and Zhao-O’Brien’s (2010) study also supported the construct 




The primary researcher contacted the NHS board that they worked for to enquire as to 
whether ethical approval from the NHS was required.  The primary researcher was 
advised that as the study was not utilising NHS patients, staff or buildings, ethical 
approval was outside the NHS remit.  This information can be seen in Appendix F. 
 
Ethical approval was then sought from the University of Edinburgh’s Clinical 
Psychology ethics panel.  Ethical approval was granted by this panel who also decided 
that further approval from the School of Health in Social Sciences was not required.  
This information can be seen in Appendix G. 
 
2.2.5 Consent 
Participants were clearly informed that they did not have to take part.  They were 
advised that if they decided not to participate after reading the information sheet, they 
need do nothing more.  Participants were also advised that if they were affected by 
anything in the questionnaires or if they required further information about the study, 
they could contact the primary researcher.  Full contact details of the primary researcher 
and the research supervisor were provided.  In addition to this, participants were 
provided with comprehensive information on what participation would involve.  A copy 
of the participant information sheet can be seen in Appendices H (study one) and I 
(study two) for individuals who participated online and in Appendix J for participants 
who completed the paper version in study two. 
 
2.2.6 Confidentiality 
All identifying information was stored in a location only accessible by the primary 
researcher.  Where participants completed the paper version of the questionnaires, their 
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contact details were removed and stored separately from the results.  On the second 
testing occasion in study two, all participants were provided with unique identifying 
numbers in order that their responses on the two occasions could be matched without 
them having to provide their contact details again.  At the end of the studies, all 
identifying information was destroyed.  All participants were fully informed about how 
their results and information would be stored and managed. 
 
2.2.7 Duty of Care 
One of the questionnaires given to participants was a screening measure for symptoms 
of anxiety and depression, the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  As the study was not 
fully anonymous, it was decided that the primary researcher had a duty of care to inform 
participants if they scored highly on this measure.  As mentioned above, participants 
were asked to indicate whether they wished to receive this information if they did obtain 
high scores.  In this measure, a score of at least 11 on each subscale is believed to 
indicate “definite cases” of anxiety or depression (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983, p.363).  As 
mentioned above, there is some uncertainty about the HADS’ ability to detect clinical 
cases with some studies suggesting it may identify more cases than is actually the case 
(Dunbar et al., 2000).  Herrmann (1997) also suggested that there is “no single, 
generally accepted cutoff score for the HADS” (p.21).  It was thus decided that 
participants who requested feedback on this measure would be informed if they received 
scores of 13 or more.  Participants were advised that they would receive this feedback 
after the second testing occasion.  There were three participants who had scored highly 
and requested to be informed of this.  All of these participants had completed the online 
version of the questionnaires.  An email was sent to each participant which advised them 
that their scores were higher but emphasised that this measure was a screening tool only 
and was not diagnostic.  This email also provided links to online information about 
anxiety and depression and it advised that participants contact their general practitioner 





The above measures were put online using the Bristol Online Survey Tool (Institute of 
Learning and Research Technology) to establish a single survey.  This tool was chosen 
as it was used by the institution attended by the primary researcher.  The location of the 
website was emailed to contacts of the primary researcher with a request to access the 
link for further information on the study and to participate.  The email also requested 
that recipients forward it to others whom they thought may also be willing to participate, 
thus using a snowballing sampling technique.  The content of this email can be seen in 
Appendix L and the participant information provided at the survey website can be seen 
in Appendix H.  Using an online survey increased accessibility to the study and also 
reduced the amount of paper used.  Administrators of the Bristol Online Survey Tool 
were allowed access to the survey, however, a filter was applied that allowed them only 
limited access to the results.  This meant that participants’ email addresses were only 
known to the primary researcher.  Raw data were transferred to an excel spreadsheet, 
however, email addresses were not included in this spreadsheet.  The data recorded by 
the survey tool were deleted following the completion of the study and this included the 
record of participants’ email addresses. 
 
2.2.9 Order of Questionnaires 
The Bristol Online Survey Tool does not allow for randomisation of question order, thus 
the questionnaires had to remain in the same order for each participant.  It has been 
highlighted by Johnston (1999) that putting the HADS amongst other questionnaires can 
influence HADS responses depending on the content of the other questionnaires.  
Therefore, it was decided that the HADS would follow the demographic questionnaire in 
order that completing the other questionnaires would not elevate participants’ anxiety 
and depression responses.  Given the similarity of the CFQ, FFMQ and the AAQ-II, it 
was decided that the BIDR would be positioned between the CFQ and FFMQ to 
alleviate the potential for monotony.  Thus the final order of the questionnaires were as 
follows:  Demographic Questionnaire, HADS, CFQ, BIDR, FFMQ, AAQ-II. 
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2.3 Study Two – Test-retest Reliability of the CFQ/Relationship with HADS 
Study two assessed the test-retest reliability of the CFQ and how the CFQ related to 
symptoms of anxiety and depression. 
 
2.3.1 Participants 
A further 103 participants were recruited.  These were combined with the participants in 
study one to total 150 participants.  Six of these were excluded due to missing responses 
to the CFQ.  This resulted in 144 participants for the analysis of relationship between the 
CFQ and the HADS.  The sample consisted of 57 males and 87 females, 40 per cent 
males and 60 per cent females.  The mean age of participants was 39 years and ages 
ranged from 18 to 77 years (SD 13.54), while 79 per cent of the sample had some form 
of further education. 
 
Out of the 103 newly recruited participants, 61 consented to take part on the second 
occasion.  Another 27 of the participants in study one consented to participate on a 
second occasion.  After the six cases were excluded due to missing data, a total of 82 
participants remained for the test-retest reliability analysis; 34 males and 48 females.  
Male participants constituted 41.5 per cent of the sample while 58.5 per cent were 
female and 60 participants had received some form of further education.  The mean age 
of participants was 41 years (SD = 13.84) and ages ranged from 18 to 77 years.  The 
majority of participants (71) completed the online version of the study while 11 
participants completed the paper version (details below).  All participants were 
contacted one month after their initial participation, however, the time they took to 
respond varied.  The amount of days between testing time one and two was calculated 
for each participant.  The mean number of days was found to be 33 and ranged from 28 
to 56 days. 
 
2.3.2 Exclusion Criteria 




Study two used the demographic questionnaire, the HADS and the CFQ as detailed 
above.  On the second testing occasion, the demographic questionnaire was not required.  
Participants were provided with a unique identifying number to enter when completing 
the questionnaires on the second occasion.  Using the HADS on both occasions would 
allow for comparison between scores on these two measures.  If scores on the CFQ were 
found to vary between the two testing occasions this may be due to changes in anxiety 
and depression symptoms and use of the HADS on both occasions would allow this to 




New participants were contacted using the same email procedure as outlined above.  
Participant information for this study can be seen in Appendix I.  After a period of one 
month, participants were emailed by the primary researcher with details of the weblink 
to access further information on the study and the questionnaires.  The content of this 
email can be seen in Appendix M.  In addition to this, participants were provided with a 
unique identifying number known only to the primary researcher.  This meant that they 
did not have to re-enter their email address, thus ensuring confidentiality.  At the start of 
participation on the second occasion, participants were requested to enter this number. 
 
In addition to the use of the online method of participation, a paper and pencil method 
was also developed in order to enable a wide cross section of the population to 
participate in the study.  Two supermarkets were contacted by the primary researcher 
with the request that copies of the questionnaire packs be distributed amongst their staff.  
Both supermarkets consented to this and 20 copies of the questionnaire packs were given 
to each of them.  In addition to this, a hotel was contacted by the primary researcher and 
10 copies of the questionnaire packs were distributed for the staff who worked there.  
Paper copies of the questionnaire packs were also given to contacts of the primary 
researcher who did not have access to the internet.  A further 20 paper copies were 
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distributed to small businesses for staff to complete and members of the public.  Full 
details about the study were attached to each pack of questionnaires along with a 
stamped addressed envelope for returning the questionnaires.  The participant 
information provided with the questionnaires can be seen in Appendix J.  In this case, 
participants were requested to record their name and address, rather than their email 
address if they wished to participate again on the second occasion.  When the 
questionnaires were posted back to the primary researcher, contact details were removed 
from the questionnaires which were then given a unique identifying number.  Contact 
details were stored separately from the questionnaires and then destroyed once 
participants had been sent the questionnaire pack on the second occasion. 
 
2.3.5 Order of Questionnaires 
On both testing occasions, participants were presented with the demographic 
questionnaire, followed by the HADS and the CFQ.  Both online and paper versions 
followed this order for consistency. 
 
2.4 Study Three – Factor Analysis of the CFQ 
Study three aimed to replicate the factor analysis carried out by Dempster (2009) but 
with a different population. 
 
2.4.1 Participants 
The same sample was used in this study as in the CFQ and HADS analysis in study two.  
All of the participants who participated in studies one and two were included.  As 
detailed in study two, six participants were excluded due to missing data.  This resulted 
in a total of 144 participants, 57 males and 87 females.  The sample consisted of 40 per 
cent males and 60 per cent females.  The mean age of participants was 39 years (SD = 
13.54) and ages ranged from 18 to 77 years, while 79 per cent of the sample had some 
form of further education.  A table detailing the demographics of the samples used in the 
study can be seen below. 
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Table 1 Demographics of the Samples Used in Each of the Three Studies 
 











47 82 144 144 
Mean Age of 
Participants 




11.54 13.84 13.54 13.54 
Age Range 21 – 73 years 18 – 77 years 18 – 77 years 18 – 77 years 
Total Male 24 34 57 57 
Total Female 23 48 87 87 
Further 
Education 
85 per cent 73 per cent 79 per cent 79 per cent 
 
2.4.2 Procedure 
As each participant had completed the CFQ in either study one or two, no new 
procedure was required for this study.  Results from every completed CFQ at testing 
time one were collated in order that a confirmatory factor analysis could be carried out. 
 
2.5 Analytic Plan 
 
2.5.1 Study One 
Total scores for each of the measures were calculated for each participant.  In order to 
establish whether the CFQ related to the other measures used in the study, correlational 
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analysis was used.  SPSS version 17 was used to carry out the analysis using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient (Field, 2005). 
 
2.5.2 Study Two 
Total scores for each participant were calculated at both times of testing.  Correlational 
analysis was again used to consider the relationship between CFQ scores at time one and 
time two and to consider the relationship between the CFQ and the HADS.  SPSS 
version 17 was used to carry out the analysis using Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
(Field, 2005).  Multiple regression and the Sobel test were used to further explore the 
relationship between the CFQ and the HADS subscales (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
 
2.5.3 Study Three 
Responses for each participant were gathered for each item of the CFQ.  EQS for 
Windows version 6 was used to carry out the confirmatory factor analysis (Bentler & 
Wu, 2002). 
 
2.6 Missing Data 
In many studies, the problem of missing data is managed by deleting cases from the 
analyses.  However, this is likely to reduce the sample variance in addition to lowering 
the sample size (Jackson et al., 2009).  Other techniques can be used to deal with 
missing data and Shrive et al. (2006) carried out a study to assess these.  Shrive et al. 
(2006) reported that both multiple imputation and individual mean imputation performed 
well.  There are, however, disadvantages to both.  Using the individual mean in the place 
of missing values reduces the variability of response (Hawthorne & Elliot, 2005).  The 
individual mean is a simpler method, however, than multiple imputation and Shrive et 
al. (2006, p.57) caution that multiple imputation “is complex and likely to be unfamiliar 
to many readers and researchers”. 
 
It was decided that where participants had missed more than ten per cent of responses, 
they would be excluded from the analyses.  If they missed more than ten per cent of total 
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responses, the case was removed completely from the study.  In cases where more than 
ten per cent of responses for a single measure were missing, the case was removed from 
the analyses for that particular measure only.  In cases where less than ten per cent of 
responses were missing, individual means were used to replace missing values.  In study 
one, two cases had missing data replaced in the HADS and another two had missing data 
replaced in the CFQ.  Six cases had missing data replaced in the FFMQ and four in the 
BIDR.  Two cases had missing data replaced in the AAQ-II.  In study two, eight cases 
had missing data replaced in the CFQ at testing time one.  At testing time two, three 
cases had missing data replaced in the CFQ and one case had missing data replaced in 
the HADS.  In study three, eight cases had missing data replaced in the CFQ.  In all of 
these cases, ten per cent or less of the responses were missing and subsequently 
replaced.  One case was excluded from the whole of study one as data were missing 
from the CFQ.  One case was excluded in the analyses between the CFQ and the AAQ-II 
due to missing data in the AAQ-II.  One case was also excluded in the analyses between 
the CFQ and the BIDR due to missing responses to the BIDR.  No other cases were 
required to be removed.  In studies two and three, six cases were excluded from the 





3.1 Study One 
The frequencies from each measure can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Frequencies for CFQ, FFMQ, BIDR and AAQII 
 
Measure Mean Total Score Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
CFQ 37.5 11.8 18-65 
FFMQ 133.5 18 92-166 
BIDR 
Self-deception 
90.9 15.1 59-121 
BIDR Impression 
Management 
82.9 14.4 55-120 
AAQII 24.9 7.8 12-42 
 
The distribution of the data was analysed.  Data gathered on the CFQ was not 
significantly skewed, although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant.  
Transforming the data using log transformations was found to remove the significance 
of this test.  Three outliers were removed from the AAQ-II data in order to ensure the 
data were normally distributed.  The data from the FFMQ total score was found to be 
normally distributed.  When the five facets of the FFMQ were considered individually, 
the observe, describe and non-judge facets had significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.  
However, their skewness and kurtosis scores were not significant.  Transforming the 
data did not help with the normality of the observe facet data, therefore, the raw data 
were used.  Square root transformed data was used with the describe facet and log 
transformed data were used with the non-judge facet.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
was significant for the impression management subscale of the BIDR only.  The removal 
of three outliers removed the significant result. 
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A large negative correlation was found between scores on the CFQ and scores on the 




Figure 1 – Scatterplot of CFQ and FFMQ Total Score Correlations 
 
 
When the different facets of the FFMQ were considered individually, no significant 
relationships were found between the CFQ and the observe and describe facets 
respectively.  A moderate negative correlation was found between the CFQ and the act 
with awareness facet, r = -.49; n = 47; p <0.1 (one tailed).  A larger negative correlation 
was found between the CFQ and the non-judge facet, r = -.62; n = 47; p<.01.  A 
significant negative correlation was also found between the CFQ and the non-react facet, 
r = -.57; n = 47; p <.01 (one tailed). 
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A strong positive correlation was found between scores on the CFQ and scores on the 




 Figure 2 – Scatterplot of CFQ and AAQII Total Score Correlations 
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A negative correlation was found between CFQ scores and scores on the self-deception 
subscale of the BIDR, r = -.61; n = 46; p<.01.  No significant relationship was found 
between scores on the CFQ and scores on the impression management subscale of the 










 Figure 4 – Scatterplot of CFQ and BIDR Impression Management Total  
      Score Correlations 
 
A summary of the correlation coefficients can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 3 – Summary of Correlation Coefficients 
Measure Correlation Coefficient 
FFMQ -.61* 
FFMQ Observe facet .06 
FFMQ Describe facet -.17 
FFMQ Act with Awareness facet -.49* 
FFMQ Non Judge facet -.62* 
FFMQ Non React facet -.57* 
BIDR Impression Management (continuous) -.26 
BIDR Self-deception (continuous) -.61* 
AAQ-II .58* 
* = significant at .01 level 
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3.2 Study Two 
The frequencies of each measure from testing time one can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 4 – CFQ, HADS Anxiety and HADS Depression Frequencies at Time One 
 
Measure Mean Total Score Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
CFQ 37.2 10.9 17-65 
HADS Anxiety 6.6 3.4 0-16 
HADS Depression 3 2.5 0-14 
 
The distribution of the data was analysed.  At testing time one, CFQ data was found to 
be positively skewed and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant.  The use of log 
transformations reduced the skew and this test was no longer significant.  At testing time 
two, CFQ data were again positively skewed, although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
was not significant.  The removal of an outlier reduced the skew. 
 
At testing time one, the skewness and kurtosis scores on the HADS anxiety subscale 
were not significant, however, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant.  
Transforming the data did not remove the significance of this test, therefore, the raw 
data were used.  Two outliers were removed from the HADS anxiety data at testing time 
two which reduced the significance of the skewness and kurtosis scores, however, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was still significant. 
 
Scores on the depression subscale of the HADS were found to be significantly positively 
skewed at both testing times and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant on both 
occasions.  Transforming the data did not affect the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests but did reduce the skewness and kurtosis scores to normal levels, therefore, log 
transformed data were used with the data from time one and square root transformed 
data were used with the data from testing time two. 
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The data analysis found a strong positive correlation between participant scores on the 
CFQ at testing times one and two, r = .76; n = 81; p <.01 (one tailed).  This result can be 
seen in Figure 5. 
 
 Figure 5 – Scatterplot of Correlation between CFQ Total Scores at Time One and  
     Time Two 
 
74 
A strong positive correlation was found between scores on the anxiety subscale of the 
HADS and scores on the CFQ at testing time one, r = .54; n = 144; p <.01 (one tailed).  




 Figure 6 – Scatterplot of Correlation between CFQ Total Scores and HADS Anxiety  
     Total Scores at Time One 
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A positive correlation was found between scores on the depression subscale of the 
HADS and the CFQ at testing time one, r = .39; n = 144; p <.01 (one tailed).  This 




 Figure 7 – Scatterplot of Correlation between CFQ Total Scores and HADS  
     Depression Total Scores at Time One 
 
Scores on the CFQ at time one were also found to positively correlate with scores on the 
anxiety subscale of the HADS at time two, r = .53; n = 80; p <.01 (one tailed).  Scores 
on the CFQ at time one were moderately correlated with scores on the depression 
subscale of the HADS at time two, r = .31; n = 82; p <.01 (one tailed). 
 
3.2.1 Mediation Analyses 
To test for mediation, a number of steps must be followed (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
Regression equations must be considered between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable, between the independent variable and the mediator and between the 
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dependent variable and the mediator and independent variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
If the mediator does show evidence of full or partial mediation of the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable, the significance of that 
mediation also has to be tested and one way in which to do this is to use the Sobel test 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
 
The relationship between the HADS and the CFQ was further explored using multiple 
regression.  A significant relationship was found between HADS anxiety scores at 
testing time one and two, β = .71; p <0.01.  A significant relationship was also found 
between the HADS anxiety scores at time one and CFQ scores at time one, β = .54; 
p<0.01.  In addition to this, a significant relationship was found between the CFQ at 
time one and HADS anxiety at time two while controlling for HADS anxiety at time 
one, β = .22; p<0.05.  When the CFQ scores at time one were included in the analyses, 
this was found to attenuate the relationship between HADS scores at time one and time 
two, β = .59; p<0.01.  The Sobel test was used to test whether the mediation was 
significant which produced a statistic of 2.28; p<0.05.  Thus, while the level of anxiety 
symptoms at time one predicts the level of anxiety participants will experience one 
month later, this relationship is partially mediated by the degree of cognitive fusion at 
time one. 
 
The same method was applied to the depression subscale of the HADS.  A significant 
relationship was found between HADS depression scores at testing time one and testing 
time two, β = .52; p <0.01.  A significant relationship was also found between the HADS 
depression scores at time one and CFQ scores at time one, β = .39; p<0.01.  The 
relationship between the CFQ at time one and HADS depression at time two, while 
controlling for HADS depression at time one, was not significant β = .14; NS.  Thus 
cognitive fusion does not mediate the relationship between depression scores between 
time one and time two. 
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A schematic representation of the mediation analysis for HADS anxiety can be seen in 
Figure Eight. 
 
Step one:  A significant relationship is found between the predictor variable (HADS 






Step two:  A significant relationship is found between the predictor variable and 







scores at time one 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time two 
CFQ scores at 
time one β = .54 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time one 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time two 
CFQ scores at 
time one 
β = .71 
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Step three:  A significant relationship is found between the mediator variable and the 







Step four:  Including the mediator attenuates the relationship between the predictor 





Figure 8 – Schematic Representation of Mediator Role of CFQ Total Scores at Time 
One in Relationship between HADS anxiety Total Scores at Time One and Time Two. 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time one 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time two 
CFQ scores at 
time one β = .22 
β = .59 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time one 
HADS anxiety 
scores at time two 
CFQ scores at 
time one β = .22 
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3.3 Study Three 
 
The internal consistency of the CFQ was measured using Cronbach’s alpha and found to 
be .81.  The data were investigated for normality.  This found that eight of the items 
were positively skewed and the Kolmogorov Smirnov test was significant for all of the 
items.  Transforming the data did not significantly change the results, therefore the raw 
data were used.  As the exploratory factor analysis by Dempster (2009) found a two 
factor model to be the best fit of the data, this model was also used in the present study.  
Most of the items were expected to load onto the first factor, with the four reversed 
scored items (items 3, 6, 9 and 12) loading onto the second factor.  A correlated two 
factor model and a one factor model were also assessed.  The results can be seen in 
Table 5 as follows. 
 
Table 5 – Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Detailing Goodness of Fit Indices for  




One factor model Two factor model Two factor 
correlated model 
Bentler-Bonett non-
normed fit index 
0.798 0.944 0.942 
Comparative fit 
index 




0.111 0.058 0.06 
Chi-square 176.839 93.815 93.579 
Chi-square 
significance 
p<.001 p<.01 p<.01 
 
Bentler and Bonett (1980, p.600) stated that “models with overall fit indices of less than 
.9 can usually be improved substantially”.  Schreiber et al. (2006, p.330) have proposed 
that root mean-square error of approximation cutoff scores are <.06 to .08 for 
“acceptable fit”.  In addition to this, they suggested that comparative fit index cutoff 
scores should be ≥.95 to be satisfactory.  Thus, the two factor model was found to be a 
80 
good fit.  The chi-square score significantly reduced from the one factor to the two 
factor model, suggesting that the two factor model is a better fit.  Correlating the two 





4.1 Study One 
Study one considered the validity of the CFQ.  As expected, the CFQ correlated 
negatively and significantly with the FFMQ, thus as cognitive fusion increases, 
mindfulness scores decrease.  This supports the construct validity of the CFQ as it has 
been found to correlate in the expected direction with a measure of a related construct.  
A fairly large correlation was found (see table 3, p.71) and this may reflect the 
similarities between mindfulness and defusion as discussed in the introduction section.  
The fact that this relationship was strong may support the argument that defusion and 
mindfulness are the same constructs.  As discussed above, descriptions of defusion and 
mindfulness are very similar (Brown & Ryan, 2004; Hayes & Shenk, 2004).  However, 
mindfulness itself is not yet fully understood which makes it more difficult to understand 
this construct in relation to defusion.   
 
Interestingly, the CFQ did not correlate with the observe or describe facets of this 
measure.  During assessment of the FFMQ, Baer et al. (2006) reported uncertain 
findings in terms of how the observe facet correlated with other constructs.  It also did 
not fit with the confirmatory factor analysis model tested by Baer et al. (2006).  In a later 
study, Baer et al. (2008) found that the observe facet functioned in a different manner 
for individuals with experience of meditation.  Baer et al. (2008) suggest that observing 
may not always be done in a mindful manner and if this is the case, may actually 
contribute to psychological difficulties.  McKee et al. (2007) also found that the observe 
facet of the KIMS (from which the FFMQ was developed) was not related to “anxiety 
sensitivity” or “negative affectivity” (p.97).  The other facets were found to relate to at 
least one of these constructs.  These results suggest that ‘observe’ may not always 




Larger negative correlations were found between the CFQ and the act with awareness, 
non-react and non-judge facets.  When considering the definitions of the separate facets, 
it is perhaps understandable why the CFQ related most strongly with the non-judge 
facet.  This facet is described by Baer et al. (2008) as “taking a non-evaluative stance 
toward thoughts and feelings” (p.330).  Similarly, the non-react facet, with which the 
CFQ is also strongly related is described as “the tendency to allow thoughts and feelings 
to come and go without getting caught up in or carried away by them” (Baer et al., 2008, 
p.330).  These descriptions have obvious parallels with definitions of cognitive defusion.  
As reported in the method section above, Forman, Herbert et al. (2007) found that 
change in the observe and describe facets of the KIMS were most strongly related to CT 
outcome in their study.  The other facets of the KIMS in addition to experiential 
avoidance were found to be related more to the ACT outcome.  This result is consistent 
with the present finding that the CFQ did not relate to the observe and describe facets of 
the FFMQ.  The results in relation to the FFMQ support and build upon the finding by 
Dempster (2009) that the CFQ had a large negative correlation with the Southampton 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) (Chadwick et al. 2008).  As mentioned in the 
introduction section, the SMQ was developed to consider mindful responding to 
psychotic symptoms, while the FFMQ assesses mindfulness as a multi-faceted construct.  
Further research will be required to tease out the relationship between the CFQ and 
measures of mindfulness.  The sample size in study one was not large and this may have 
influenced the results. 
 
As expected, the CFQ positively correlated with the AAQ-II.  Therefore, as CFQ scores 
increased, experiential avoidance scores also increased.  This supports the results found 
by Dempster (2009) who found a large correlation between these measures.  Dempster 
(2009) had cautioned that the strong correlation found may indicate that the AAQ-II and 
the CFQ are not entirely distinct.  This is not surprising given that cognitive fusion and 
experiential avoidance are closely related and both contribute to psychological 
inflexibility (Hayes et al., 2006).  Cognitive fusion is also believed to encourage 
experiential avoidance (Greco et al., 2008).  In addition to this, there is some similarity 
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between items in these measures.  Again this is to be expected as the AAQ-II is a 
measure of experiential avoidance which includes avoidance of thoughts (Hayes et al., 
2004).  It is possible that the AAQ-II has focused too much on the avoidance of 
thoughts.  Although the current study found a correlation between these measures, it was 
smaller than that found by Dempster (2009).  Barker et al. (2002) have suggested that 
correlations of greater than r = .7 indicate that two measures are assessing the same 
construct and reported that correlations of r = .5 indicate good validity.  The correlation 
between the CFQ and the AAQ-II found in the current study (r = .58) is closer to r = .5 
which suggests good validity.  Interestingly, the correlation between the FFMQ and the 
CFQ was greater than this (r = .61).  Further research is required to investigate the 
relationship between the AAQ-II and the CFQ.  The small sample size in the current 
study must also be noted, particularly after the removal of three outliers for this 
particular analysis. 
 
No significant relationship was found between the impression management subscale of 
the BIDR and the CFQ.  The absence of a significant correlation between the impression 
management subscale and the CFQ may indicate that participants in the current study 
were not consciously attempting to appear more desirable.  A significant negative 
relationship was identified between the self-deception subscale of the BIDR and the 
CFQ.  A negative correlation suggests that as self-deception scores increase, cognitive 
fusion scores decrease.  It has been suggested that self-deception is a more unconscious 
process while impression management is situation dependent and individuals are more 
aware of their attempts to appear socially desirable in this respect (Paulhus, 1991).  The 
current finding may suggest that individuals who are more self-deceiving may respond 
with lower scores on the CFQ.  It is possible that these results indicate that individuals 
with high levels of cognitive fusion have greater self-awareness.  This result appears 
contradictory, suggesting that those who are less fused with their thoughts are also less 
self-aware.  However as stated in the method section above, Paulhus (1991) described 
self-deception as the “tendency to give self-reports that are honest but positively biased” 
(p.37).  Paulhus (1991) has also noted that self-deception scores correlate positively with 
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adjustment, while Stöber et al. (1991) stated that they correlate positively with self-
esteem but negatively with “anxiety, depression and distress” (p.372).  Paulhus (1991) 
further cautioned that a strong relationship between a measure and the self-deception 
subscale does not necessarily indicate a flaw in that measure.  This is due, it is argued, to 
self-deception being an aspect of “personality constructs” (Paulhus, 1991, p.22) while 
impression management tends to be independent of these and influenced more by the 
situation.  If the self-deception subscale relates to internal upset as described, this may 
explain why the CFQ negatively correlated with this measure as the CFQ was found to 
relate positively to the HADS.  Paulhus (1991) concluded that only impression 
management should be controlled for, while controlling for self-deception has been 
found to reduce the predictive validity of a measure. 
 
4.2 Study Two 
Study two considered the test-retest reliability of the CFQ and also how it related to a 
measure of anxiety and depression symptoms.  Gravetter and Wallnau (2000) stated that 
a measure is assumed to be reliable if it produces “stable, consistent measurements” 
(p.530).  As detailed above, a large positive correlation was found between scores on the 
CFQ at time one and two.  This suggests that the CFQ has high test-retest reliability and 
should consistently yield the same results over time.  The CFQ is thus likely to be useful 
in measuring change over time and there can be greater confidence in the scores 
obtained.  As cautioned by Barker et al. (2002), however, the large correlation may also 
indicate that the CFQ is insensitive to change.  As discussed in the introduction section, 
fusion and defusion are not permanent states, they vary depending upon the context, 
although it is likely that some individuals engage in cognitive fusion more often than 
others (Blackledge, 2007). 
 
Further research is required to investigate the sensitivity of the CFQ.  It is possible that 
the relatively short period of one month between the two testing occasions has 
contributed to the high correlation.  It would be useful to consider how the CFQ 
performs over longer testing periods, particularly as psychological therapy is likely to 
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cover a greater time period than one month.  The use of a community sample may also 
have influenced the results.  It would be expected that such a sample will demonstrate 
less change than, for example, a clinical sample undergoing psychological therapy.  This 
emphasises the need for further assessment of the CFQ, in particular in a clinical 
population and also with individuals who are in therapy.  Indeed, Hayes et al. (1987) 
highlights the importance of establishing whether measures have clinical utility, that is, 
whether they are useful in clinical work.  Hayes et al. (1987) state that while it is 
important for measures to demonstrate good reliability and validity, this is redundant if 
they are not functional in everyday therapeutic settings.  In addition to this, Clark and 
Watson (1995) state that “a series of investigations is required even to begin the process 
of identifying the psychological construct that underlies a measure” (p.310).  At present 
it is unknown whether the CFQ will be of benefit clinically, however, the CFQ continues 
to be tested and is currently being assessed in a depressed sample (Kerr, 2010). 
 
In addition to this, study two found moderate correlations between the CFQ and the 
anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS respectively.  It is not surprising that the 
CFQ has correlated with the HADS.  If cognitive fusion is involved in psychopathology 
as believed (Blackledge, 2007), it would be expected that a measure of cognitive fusion 
would correlate with a measure of anxiety and depression symptoms.  These results are 
supportive of the construct validity of the CFQ.  It is interesting that the CFQ correlated 
more strongly with the anxiety subscale of the HADS than the depression subscale.  The 
two subscales of the HADS have been found to be highly related (Bjelland et al., 2002) 
and thus it may be surprising that the depression subscale was not more highly 
correlated with the CFQ.  This may be due to the fact that scores on the depression 
subscale tended to be low in this study.  The HADS is a measure of anxiety and 
depression symptoms but it is not used to diagnose anxiety and depression (Herrman, 
1997).  It may be more useful to consider how the CFQ relates to diagnostic measures. 
 
Alternatively these results may suggest that cognitive fusion plays a greater role in the 
experience of anxiety than it does in depression.  As discussed in the introduction 
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section above, Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) has been developed 
specifically to treat individuals suffering from recurring depression (Segal et al., 2002).  
A particular strategy within this approach is the use of decentring and the parallels 
between this construct and defusion have been discussed above.  Ma and Teasdale 
(2004) have found that MBCT is most effective for individuals who have experienced at 
least three episodes of depression.  If decentring and defusion are related as suggested, it 
is possible that the low depression scores in the current study mean that fusion is more 
likely to be implicated in more severe levels of depression. 
 
Interestingly, the relationship between scores on the HADS anxiety subscale at time one 
and time two were influenced by the scores on the CFQ at time one.  Including the CFQ 
in the regression analyses resulted in a reduction in the variance accounted for by HADS 
scores at time one.  CFQ scores at time one could thus be described as a partial mediator 
in the relationship between the HADS anxiety scores at time one and time two.  
MacKinnon et al. (1995) stated that “a mediator is a variable that accounts for all or part 
of the relation between a predictor and an outcome” (p.41).  In this case, the CFQ was 
found to account for some of the variance between HADS anxiety at time one and time 
two which indicates it is a partial mediator.  It would be expected that HADS anxiety 
scores at time one and time two would be highly correlated and it is noteworthy that the 
CFQ accounts for some of the variance.  It would seem that cognitive fusion plays a role 
in anxiety symptoms over time.  The same was not found for depression, suggesting that 
anxiety and depression symptoms may have different relationships with cognitive fusion 
in this sample of healthy adults.  It should be noted that the method used is not the only 
procedure for testing mediation, however, it is the most common (MacKinnon et al., 
2002).  It must also be emphasised that identifying mediation does not establish a causal 
relationship. 
 
It has been suggested by Lundgren et al. (2008) that mediational studies are especially 
useful for studying ACT in order to demonstrate that results from ACT studies are due to 
the processes involved in this model.  The mediational analysis in study two adds weight 
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to the argument that cognitive fusion plays a role in the presence of anxiety symptoms.  
Arch and Craske (2008) suggested that mediational studies would help identify how 
useful defusion techniques are.  Further research could consider the use of defusion 
techniques as an intervention for anxiety disorders to further explore whether the process 
of defusion in particular can account for therapeutic change in anxiety problems. 
 
4.3 Study Three 
Study three considered the factor structure of the CFQ.  The internal consistency of this 
measure was found to be high which supports the findings of Dempster (2009).  In 
further support of Dempster’s (2009) results, confirmatory factor analysis found a two 
factor model to be the best fit of the data, indicating that the CFQ measures cognitive 
fusion and defusion.  It must be emphasised, however, that factor analysis does not allow 
for causal relationships to be identified (Breckler, 1990).  There was a large reduction in 
chi-square from the one factor to two factor model, again supporting the fit of the two 
factor model.  Correlating the two factors did not produce a better model fit.  As 
mentioned in the introduction section, the developers of the CFQ have proposed a one 
factor model and have suggested that the two factors reflect method variance pertaining 
to the wording of the questions (that is, some of the questions are reversed in order to 
prevent response bias) (Gillanders, personal correspondence, 14 June 2010).  The 
current findings are not consistent with this as correlating the two factors did not 
significantly improve the model fit. 
 
As noted in the results section, the distribution of the data in study three tended to be 
positively skewed.  It is possible to carry out factor analysis using distribution free 
methods, however, large samples are required for this (Boomsma, 2000).  Jackson et al. 
(2009) have advised that where distributions are not normal, there is increased risk of 
making a Type I error.  Although the fit of the two factor model in the current study may 
have been overestimated, it was still found to be a better fit than the one factor model 
and this result is consistent with the exploratory factor analysis carried out by Dempster 
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(2009).  In addition to this, during the development of the CFQ, items were selected 
based on whether they were normally distributed (Dempster, 2009). 
 
4.4 Limitations 
Some biases may be present in the data collected.  More females than males participated 
in studies two and three.  Participants were also more likely to have had further 
education.  It is possible that the items in the CFQ may lack simplicity and thus those 
with higher levels of education may have been more predisposed to take part in the 
study.  Attempts were made to contact individuals with lower levels of education, 
however, this did not prove fruitful.  In addition, increased effort was also made to 
recruit male participants for studies two and three.  Data from the depression subscale 
was found to be significantly skewed in a positive direction at both times of testing, 
indicating that depression symptoms were low in this sample.  This is likely to be due to 
the healthy adult sample used in these studies where anxiety symptoms are more likely 
to vary as individuals tend to experience stress more frequently than changes in mood. 
 
The management of missing data followed guidance from the research literature, 
however, it remains the case that removal of outliers and the use of mean imputation to 
replace missing data may have biased the results (Hawthorne & Elliot, 2005).  As 
mentioned above, some researchers have found the use of individual mean imputation to 
work well and recommend this approach over others (Shrive et al., 2006).  Multiple 
imputation has also been recommended (Schafer & Graham, 2002), however, Shrive et 
al. (2006) have suggested that this technique can be confusing and difficult to 
understand.  In the current study, relatively little data was missing and cases where more 
than 10 percent of responses was missing were excluded from the analysis.  It is thus 
unlikely that the data was significantly affected by the methods used to handle the 
missing data. 
 
These studies may be limited by the other questionnaires they used.  Each of the other 
questionnaires have their own short comings.  For example, the factor structure of the 
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HADS has been queried as some researchers suggest it taps into three factors rather than 
two (McCue et al., 2006; Dunbar et al., 2000).  Other researchers query the extent to 
which anxiety and depression symptoms are distinct and whether it is appropriate to 
assess them as separate constructs (Bjelland et al., 2002).  The factor structure of the 
BIDR has also been questioned and Leite and Beretvas (2005) have suggested that 
“researchers should be careful when attempting to correct scores of other scales based on 
social desirability scores” (p.152).  When stating this, they referred both to the BIDR 
and another measure of social desirability. 
 
The FFMQ is still a relatively new measure and has not been fully assessed itself, 
although it is a development of an earlier measure, the Kentucky Inventory of 
Mindfulness Skills (KIMS) (Baer et al., 2004).  As mentioned in the introduction 
section, Van Dam et al. (2009) have highlighted that the FFMQ operates differently in 
individuals who meditate compared to those who do not.  Further to this, these 
researchers have suggested that those who score more highly on mindfulness in this 
measure may actually just be more aware that their attention has wandered, rather than 
being more mindful.  They have proposed that the fact that meditators score more highly 
does not necessarily mean they are more mindful, rather they may respond differently to 
the questions and thus the items on the FFMQ “function differently” between those who 
meditate and those who do not (Van Dam et al., 2009, p.516).  Van Dam et al. (2009) 
stated that this weakens the FFMQ’s construct validity.  This is similar to a statement 
made by Petersen and Zettle (2009) regarding the AAQ (first version) who suggested 
that the questions asked by this measure “may become at least somewhat transparent to 
those who have even minimal exposure to ACT” (p.532).  Participants may thus become 
aware of how they may be expected to respond.  The selection of questionnaires for the 
present studies was based on earlier research and are believed to have been the best 
measures available for the current purposes. 
 
A further potential limitation of the current study concerns the use of online 
questionnaires.  It has been suggested by some researchers that completing 
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questionnaires online may inflate the results (Andersson et al., 2003; Buchanan, 2003).  
This may be due to the increased anonymity brought by this method which reduces the 
influence of social desirability (McCue et al., 2006).  Buchanan (2003) has emphasised 
that measures may change when put online and it is uncertain if they retain their 
reliability, validity and factor structure.  As the current study has used predominantly an 
online version of the CFQ it may be wise to exercise caution when using the paper 
format.  This study may also have been limited by mixing the formats of participation 
and it may be necessary to replicate this study using the paper form.  The study by 
Dempster (2009), however, used mainly paper forms.  The fact that comparable results 
have been found between the current study and that by Dempster (2009) suggests that 
the online version of the CFQ performs in a similar manner to the paper format. 
 
If online questionnaire scores are inflated and if this is due to increased anonymity, it is 
possible that this criticism may not be applied to the current study as participants were 
requested to provide their email addresses.  Although this was optional, it must be noted 
that the majority of participants did consent to being contacted again and recorded their 
email address.  Further to this, the current study focused on the relationships (if any) 
between measures.  If it is true that questionnaire scores are influenced by online 
participation, it is likely that all of the questionnaires will be affected by this.  
Alternatively, the inclusion of participants who did not provide contact details with those 
who did may have negatively impacted upon the results as some responses may be 
inflated while others were not. 
 
From an alternative perspective, Andersson et al. (2003) found that scores yielded by an 
online version of the HADS were similar to those produced from paper and pencil 
forms.  These researchers caution, however, that further consideration needs to be given 
about the scores required to identify clinical cases when this measure is completed.  This 
was also suggested by Buchanan (2003) who suggested that different norms may need to 
be developed for online formats of measures.  It must be emphasised that the use of the 
internet in research is still at an early stage (Andersson et al., 2003).  Online versions of 
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therapy such as CBT are used, therefore, it is necessary to consider how online forms of 
measures perform.  In addition to this, Masuda et al. (2010) have suggested that 
computer based programmes may be helpful in reducing “variability” (p.16) in 
experimental conditions and can potentially reduce experimenter effects. 
 
The use of a self-report format has inherent short comings in general which were 
discussed in the introduction section.  In addition to this it may be particularly limiting 
when measuring a construct such as cognitive fusion.  As mentioned in the introduction, 
cognitive fusion is believed to be influenced by context and self-report measures are 
unable to take this into consideration (Hayes et al., 2004).  Indeed, Hayes et al. (1987) 
has stated that “psychometrics evaluates assessment structurally, not functionally” 
(p.972).  In support of this, Arch and Craske (2008) suggested that “behavioural and 
physiological measures” (p.267) are used rather than self-reports to measure cognitive 
fusion.  They proposed that changes in avoidance in addition to changes in physiological 
response to distressing stimuli could be measured following a defusion intervention. 
 
Further to this, the use of a test-retest analysis to measure reliability of the CFQ may not 
have been the most appropriate method for this purpose.  As detailed in the introduction 
section, cognitive fusion is not permanent (Blackledge, 2007).  Although some people 
are likely to experience it more often than others, given that fusion is influenced by 
context and thus is likely to fluctuate between settings (Hayes et al., 2006), it is perhaps 
inappropriate to expect it to remain constant over time.  Further assessment of the 
reliability of the CFQ may be beneficial using a different method of analysis such as 
split-half reliability, although study three used Cronbach’s alpha to measure the internal 
consistency of the CFQ and found it to be high.  Barker et al. (2002) have stated that 
split-half reliability has been “replaced by Cronbach’s alpha” (p.62). 
 
A final limitation of the CFQ may be perceived in its relation to anxiety symptoms.  As 
mentioned, the CFQ was found to positively correlate with the anxiety subscale of the 
HADS.  It could be argued that this may indicate that the CFQ is a measure of general 
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worry or stress rather than a measure of cognitive fusion.  It is perhaps difficult to 
separate out cognitive fusion from anxiety, given that fusion is believed to play a role in 
anxiety symptoms as suggested by the mediation analysis in the current study.  It is 
possible, however, that if the CFQ were to be a measure of worry that it should have 
correlated even more highly with the HADS subscales.  In addition to this, it is unlikely 
that including the CFQ scores in the mediation analysis of anxiety symptoms between 
time one and time two would have accounted for any of the variance if the CFQ was a 
measure of anxiety symptoms. 
 
4.5 Future Research 
This leads to a consideration of future possibilities for the CFQ.  The continued focus on 
the development of the CFQ will allow for cognitive fusion to be isolated within the 
ACT model and allow for its specific contribution to psychopathology, human suffering 
and change to be measured.  It may help identify whether cognitive fusion is involved in 
the development and maintenance of mental health problems as believed (Hayes et al., 
1999) and whether there are particular disorders it is more likely to operate in.  As 
mentioned in the introduction section, the ACT model consists of six interrelated 
processes one of which is cognitive defusion (Hayes et al., 2006).  In developing a 
measure of cognitive fusion, the process of defusion is considered separately to the other 
processes.  It was argued in the introduction section that this would allow for the 
measurement of the contribution this process makes in terms of the model and 
therapeutic change.  It would also allow for defusion to be considered in greater detail 
and how it may be distinct from other constructs such as decentring. 
 
From an alternative perspective, it is possible that separating out the processes of ACT is 
inadvisable due to their linked nature and the belief that they have a combined effect.  It 
may not be possible to fully separate these processes (McCracken & Vowles, 2008).  
Indeed, McCracken and Vowles (2008) stated that “there is a need to continue to study 
the ACT model as a whole, with each of its constituent parts considered together” 
(p.405).  From a similar perspective, Baer et al. (2004) also suggested that the KIMS 
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may separate mindfulness out when it is actually a “more integrated phenomenon” 
(p.204).  This could be equally true of defusion and the ACT model and while it is useful 
to consider defusion in isolation, it may also be fruitful to study it in relation to the other 
ACT processes. 
 
The close relationship between experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion as discussed 
above may mean that it is difficult to separate these processes.  Greco et al. (2008) 
developed a questionnaire for young people measuring both avoidance and cognitive 
fusion.  Items in this measure were developed from the AAQ, itself a measure of 
experiential avoidance (Hayes et al., 2004).  Further research will be required to 
establish whether it is more helpful to assess psychological flexibility as a whole or 
whether there is benefit in measuring each process contributing to flexibility separately.  
The functional contextualism approach which underlies ACT and RFT considers events 
within their context and environment and from this perspective it may be unhelpful to 
break such events down into their separate parts (Hayes et al., 1999).  When considering 
the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire, McCracken (2010) highlighted the 
“scientific instinct” (p.420) to break things down to a more simple understanding.  
McCracken (2010) has emphasised the functional contextualism approach in respect of 
acceptance and stated that “acceptance is not solely a pattern of overt action nor 
certainly a process solely based in cognition or belief.  It is a process within interactions 
between action and experiences, including those contacted directly and those structured 
by thinking and believing” (p.420).  While it is useful to consider cognitive defusion and 
acceptance separately in order to provide a fuller understanding of them, they are both 
understood to be aspects of psychological flexibility and it may be useful to consider 
them in this way.  Further comparison of the CFQ and AAQ-II will be beneficial in this 
respect and the use of both measures in clinical studies may help this. 
 
As discussed in study three above, the factor analysis has suggested that the CFQ is 
measuring cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  It must be emphasised, however, 
that these are assumptions based upon the data.  The factor analysis indicates which 
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behaviours (i.e. self-reports of relating to cognitive events in certain ways) group 
together and from a psychometric methods perspective, it is assumed from this that the 
underlying constructs are fusion and defusion.  Such constructs cannot, however, be 
directly observed.  The functional contextualism philosophy has a different approach 
towards latent constructs (Wilson et al., 2010).  Instead, it perceives self-report measures 
as representing behaviours that are related to each other and can be grouped as ‘fusion’ 
and ‘defusion’ but that these verbal terms must not be taken too seriously, resulting in 
them becoming more than what they represent (Wilson et al., 2010).  This can be 
understood from the position of RFT, whereby language becomes problematic when 
verbal labels assume the properties of what they represent (Blackledge, 2007).  For the 
purposes of research, it is beneficial to have psychometrically sound measures, however, 
as discussed by Hayes et al. (1987), measures also need to have clinical utility.  If the 
verbal labels of ‘fusion’ and ‘defusion’ are held “lightly” as encouraged by Hayes et al. 
(1999, p.281), it is possible that the CFQ can have clinical utility in addition to 
demonstrating good psychometrics. 
 
The CFQ may be used in clinical settings where it can be used during assessment and to 
measure change throughout therapy (Hesser, 2009).  The short length of the CFQ makes 
it particularly appropriate for these purposes.  It can be used as a guide for treatment and 
to identify whether work on cognitive defusion is required and may also be used to 
highlight individual progress.  The CFQ could also be used during single case 
experimental studies to help implement evidence based practice and explore the impact 
of new interventions.  In addition to this, the developers of ACT have emphasised that 
both patients and therapists will be affected by experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion 
and the limitations of the verbal world and they encourage therapists to practice ACT 
techniques in their own lives (Hayes et al., 1999).  The CFQ could thus be used during 
ACT training in order that therapists learn from their own experiences with ACT.  The 
usefulness of this application of ACT to trainee therapist’s own lives could be 
considered by comparing training experiences which do include experiential components 
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with those that do not.  The CFQ could thus be used as part of the measurement of this 
comparison. 
 
The development of the CFQ may also help to identify the potential differences and 
similarities between ACT and other forms of psychological therapy.  As mentioned in 
the introduction section, ACT and CBT are frequently compared (Hofman & 
Asmundson, 2008).  It is possible that the CFQ may be used in studies comparing these 
two therapies to further explore their similarities and differences.  Measures of cognitive 
content also exist, such as the Automatic Thought Questionnaire (Hollon & Kendall, 
1980) and the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (Beck et al., 1991) and these could be used 
in such a study in addition to the CFQ.  Potential changes in cognitive fusion and 
cognitive content could then be measured in relation to both forms of therapy to further 
consider the processes and mechanisms by which these therapies work (Arch & Craske, 
2008).  The development of the CFQ has made this possible.  ACT could also be 
compared with other third wave therapies such as MBCT and DBT and the use of the 
CFQ may identify whether cognitive defusion is also part of these other therapies. 
 
As detailed in the introduction section, it has yet to be identified which defusion 
strategies are the most effective (Masuda et al. 2004).  The CFQ could be used to 
measure cognitive fusion levels both prior to and following the implementation of 
specific defusion techniques to help this process.  It may then be possible to recommend 
certain strategies to manage cognitive fusion.  In attempting to explore the relationship 
and similarities between defusion and other constructs, the current study focused on the 
relationship between the CFQ and a measure of mindfulness.  As detailed in the 
introduction section, defusion also shares similarities with believability (Healy et al., 
2008) and in particular, decentring (Teasdale et al., 2002).  It is likely that the CFQ will 
also correlate with measures of decentring, such as the Experiential Questionnaire 
(Fresco, Moore et al., 2007). 
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The use of ACT as an intervention for individuals from non-Western cultures was 
referred to above in the case study reported by Murrell et al. (2009).  If this is to be 
developed, it will be necessary for the CFQ to be developed for use within other cultures 
and for ethnic minorities.  Greco et al. (2008) encouraged this in relation to the 
development of their own questionnaire.  ACT may be particularly applicable for use 
with individuals from other cultures given the importance it places upon language and 
context and its behavioural analytic background (Murrell et al., 2009).  Indeed, the CFQ 
is currently being translated into Japanese, French, German, Dutch, Portuguese and 





The current studies have found that the CFQ demonstrates good test-retest reliability.  It 
has been found to correlate in the theoretically predicted directions with measures of 
mindfulness, experiential avoidance anxiety and depression.  It also appears to be 
unaffected by deliberate attempts to appear more socially desirable although individuals 
who score highly on self-deception may respond with lower scores on the CFQ.  Finally, 
the CFQ has been demonstrated to have a two factor structure.  These studies had some 
limitations and further assessment of the CFQ is required.  The development of the CFQ 
may be of benefit both clinically and within research. 
 
Throughout their studies, ACT researchers have emphasised that “the problem is not the 
presence of particular thoughts, emotions, sensations or urges:  It is the constriction of a 
human life.  The solution is not removal of difficult private events:  It is living a valued 
life” (Hayes & Wilson, 2003, p.165).  It is hoped that the development of the CFQ can 
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Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 

























1. My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
2. I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to 
do the things that I most want to do  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3. Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I know 
that they may become less important eventually  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
4. I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s 
unhelpful to me  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
5. I struggle with my thoughts  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
6. Even when I’m having upsetting thoughts, I can see 
that those thoughts may not be literally true  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
7. I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8. I need to control the thoughts that come into my head  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
9. I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different 
perspective  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
10. I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
11. I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
12. Its possible for me to have negative thoughts about 
myself and still know that I am an OK person  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
13. It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts 
even when I know that letting go would be helpful  
 




Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
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Read each item below and underline the reply which comes closest to how you have been 
feeling in the past week.  Don’t take too long over your replies, your immediate reaction to 
each item will probably be more accurate than a long, thought-out response. 
 
I feel tense or ‘wound up’   I feel as if I am slowed down 
 Most of the time Nearly all the time 
 A lot of the time Very often 
 From time to time, occasionally Sometimes 
 Not at all Not at all 
 
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy  I get a sort of frightened feeling 
 Definitely as much like ‘butterflies’ in the stomach 
 Not quite so much Not at all 
 Only a little Occasionally 
 Hardly at all Quite often 
  Very often 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if 
something awful is about to happen  I have lost interest in my appearance 
 Very definitely and quite badly Definitely 
 Yes, but not too badly I don’t take as much care as I should 
 A little, but it doesn’t worry me I may not take as much care 
 Not at all I take just as much care as ever. 
 
I can laugh and see the funny side of things I feel restless as if I have to be on  
 As much as I always could the move 
 Not quite so much now Very much indeed 
 Definitely not so much now Quite a lot 
 Not at all Not very much 
   Not at all 
 
Worrying thoughts go through my mind I look forward with enjoyment to 
 A great deal of the time things 
 A lot of the time As much as I ever did 
 Not too often Rather less than I used to 
 Very little Definitely less than I used to 
  Hardly at all 
 
I feel cheerful     I get sudden feelings of panic 
 Never Very often indeed 
 Not often Quite often 
 Sometimes Not very often 
 Most of the time Not at all 
 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed  I can enjoy a good book or radio or 
 Definitely     television programme 
 Usually Often 
 Not often Sometimes 
 Not at all Not often 




Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire 
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Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided.  Write the 
number in the blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally 
true for you. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 








very often or 
always true 
 
_____ 1.   When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving. 
_____ 2.   I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings. 
_____ 3.  I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions. 
_____ 4.   I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them. 
_____ 5.   When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted. 
_____ 6.   When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my 
body. 
_____ 7.   I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words. 
_____ 8.   I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, 
or otherwise distracted. 
_____ 9.   I watch my feelings without getting lost in them. 
_____ 10.  I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. 
_____ 11.  I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and 
emotions. 
_____ 12.  It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking. 
_____ 13.  I am easily distracted. 
_____ 14.  I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that 
way. 
_____ 15.  I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face. 
_____ 16.  I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things 
_____ 17.  I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad. 
_____ 18.  I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. 
_____ 19.  When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of 
the thought or image without getting taken over by it. 
_____ 20.  I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars 
passing. 
_____ 21.  In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting. 
_____ 22.  When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it 
because I can’t find the right words. 
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1 2 3 4 5 








very often or 
always true 
 
_____ 23.  It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m 
doing. 
 _____24.  When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after. 
_____ 25.  I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. 
_____ 26.  I notice the smells and aromas of things. 
_____ 27.  Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words. 
_____ 28.  I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 
_____ 29.  When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them 
without reacting. 
_____ 30.  I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel 
them. 
_____ 31.  I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or 
patterns of light and shadow. 
_____ 32.  My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words. 
_____ 33.  When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them 
go. 
_____ 34.  I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing. 
_____ 35.  When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad, 
depending what the thought/image is about. 
_____ 36.  I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior. 
_____ 37.  I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail. 
_____ 38.  I find myself doing things without paying attention. 




Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
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Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate 
how much you agree with it.  
 
 
 1 ----------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 ----------- 6 -----------7 
     Not True    Somewhat    Very True 
                True 
 
_____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
_____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
_____ 3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
_____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself 
_____ 5. I always know why I like things. 
_____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
_____ 7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my  
opinion. 
_____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
_____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
_____ 10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
_____ 11. I never regret my decisions. 
_____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon  
enough. 
_____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
_____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
_____ 15. I am a completely rational person. 
_____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
_____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments. 
_____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
_____ 19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
_____ 20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
_____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
_____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
_____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
_____ 24. I never swear. 
_____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
_____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
_____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
_____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.  





Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate 
how much you agree with it.  
  
 
1 ----------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 ----------- 6 -----------7 
      Not True    Somewhat    Very True 
                True 
 
_____ 30. I always declare everything at customs. 
_____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
_____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street 
_____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit 
_____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
_____ 35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
_____ 36. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
_____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really  
sick. 
_____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without  
reporting it. 
_____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits. 





Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, second version 
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Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is 





















       
1.   Its OK if I remember something unpleasant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2.   My painful experiences and memories make it 
difficult for me to live a life that I would value. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3.   I’m afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.   I worry about not being able to control my worries 
and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5.   My painful memories prevent me from having a 
fulfilling life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.   I am in control of my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Emotions cause problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives 
better than I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Worries get in the way of my success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of 




Response from NHS Ethics 
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From: Res Nos (NHS Grampian) 
Sent: 10 June 2009 13:48 
To: Campbell Lindsey (NHS Grampian) 
Subject: RE: Ethics 
Hi Lyndsey 
  
At this stage, we would need you to confirm that no NHS staff, patients or premises would be 
involved in you study at present.  If this is the case, then this is outside our remit even though 
you are an NHS employee. 
  
You should be aware that you may have a duty of care towards participants which you would 
need to address, particularly if participants score highly on the HADS questionnaire.  You may 
wish to address this prior to submitting to the Edinburgh University Ethics Committee. 
  
I hope this is helpful. 
  
Carol 
Acting Scientific Officer 
North of Scotland Research Ethics Service 
Summerfield House 
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This was felt to be a potentially interesting study which builds on research within the 
Programme. There was, however, some concern that this study has similarities with 
Maria Dempster’s study and that there may be a considerable overlap in the literature 
reviewed. This concern should be addressed along with the following points. The 
Committee does not require resubmission of the proposal.  
 
Research design. 
• The research question should be amended to talk about test-retest reliability. 
• The secondary research questions are unclear, especially with relevance to 
validity. Please clarify.  
• The procedure in terms of how the participants will be recruited, how the web 
interface will be set up and its access all need to be clarified.  
• There appear to be inconsistencies in the proposal in the number of items on the 
CFQ. In addition, the number of subjects seems to be predicated on a version of 
this measure that will not be used in the proposed study. This needs to be better 
explained. 
• It is unclear why there is a reference to ACT within the proposal. What relevance 
does this have to the proposed study? 
 
Ethics 
• The language of both the proposal, but also the Information Sheet, needs to be 
both simplified and clarified. This specifically relates to the title of the study. 
• It would be important to ascertain whether this requires NHS ethics approval.  











Measuring Thinking Styles 
 
Information for Potential Participants 
 
Purpose of the study 
This research is being carried out to measure a certain aspect of how people think. 
Unhelpful thinking styles are known to be important in the development of a range of 
psychological problems including anxiety and mood problems. This study is part of a 
series of studies being run in different parts of the United Kingdom to develop a good 
quality questionnaire of certain ways of thinking. We need to ask a lot of people to 
complete the questionnaire in order to know if it is a good measure of this thinking style. 
This thinking style is present in people who have psychological problems and those 
who don't, which is why you have been asked to participate. In addition to this, we plan 
to assess how this questionnaire relates to other aspects of thoughts and emotions 
which are measured by other questionnaires. 
 
This study is being undertaken for educational purposes and will in part contribute 
towards a doctorate degree in clinical psychology in conjunction with the University of 
Edinburgh. Before you decide if you would like to participate it is important that you 
know a bit more about the study and what participation will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and raise any questions you may have with the 
study researcher (contact details are provided at the end of this page). Please ask if 
there is anything you are unclear about or if you would like more information. 
 
Why have I been approached? 
I am seeking participants who are aged 18 and over and whose first language is 
English. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. You can choose to withdraw at any time. 
 
What does participation involve? 
I am aiming to measure how stable one of these questionnaires remains over time and 
how it relates to other questionnaires. Therefore, I would appreciate your participation 
on two occasions, one month apart. Participation should take about 25 minutes on the 
first occasion and only 10 minutes on the second occasion. There are fewer 
questionnaires included at the second time of participation. Some of the questions may 
seem quite repetitive as the questionnaires are quite similar and they use different ways 
of asking similar things. You can save your results at any time and return to them later. 
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When you begin participation you will be asked for your email address in order that I 
can contact you a month later to ask you to complete some of the questionnaires again. 
Submitting your email address implies that you consent to being contacted by myself 
one month later. You will not be contacted again following this. If you do not wish to 
participate again on the second occasion, leave the space requesting your email 
address blank and continue with the rest of the questions. 
 
What happens to my results? 
Your questionnaire results will be stored securely by the University of Edinburgh 
computing services until the survey closes (approximately May 2010). The two 
University of Edinburgh administrators of the site can access some of your results but 
your email address is only accessible by myself as the results have been filtered. No-
one else will be able to access your results. Following the closure of the survey, the 
details I hold of your email address will be destroyed and you will not be contacted 
again. Your email address and results will be kept confidential at all times. On the 
second participation occasion you will be provided with a unique identifying number so 
that you will not need to re-enter your email address. The anonymised results will be 
submitted to the University of Edinburgh as part of my doctoral thesis. I may also decide 
to publish the results, however, at no time will your email address be disclosed to 
anyone else. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation will help with the development of this questionnaire. It will identify 
whether this questionnaire is reliable over time and how it relates to other 
questionnaires which measure other aspects of thoughts and emotions. When further 
developed, this questionnaire may be used to measure the level of change in people 
who are undergoing psychological therapy. 
 
Who can I contact? 
 
If you have been affected by anything in the survey then please feel free to contact the 
Study Researcher.  
 
If you have any queries about any aspect of the study or require further information, 
please do not hesitate to contact us at the address given below: 
 








School of Health in Social Science 
Medical School  
University of Edinburgh 
Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG 
134 
 
If you wish to take part: Please click on CONTINUE to start answering the questions. 
There are 6 sections to be completed. 
 
If you do not wish to take part: I would like to thank you for taking the time to read 
through this information sheet. You can now close this page. 
 
The survey can be saved and returned to at any time and takes around 25 minutes to 
compete. 
 
Note that once you have clicked on the CONTINUE button at the bottom of each page 










Measuring Thinking Styles 
 
Information for Participants 
 
Purpose of the study 
This research is being carried out to measure a certain aspect of how people think. 
Unhelpful thinking styles are known to be important in the development of a range of 
psychological problems including anxiety and mood problems. This study is part of a 
series of studies being run in different parts of the United Kingdom to develop a good 
quality questionnaire of certain ways of thinking. We need to ask a lot of people to 
complete the questionnaire in order to know if it is a good measure of this thinking style. 
This thinking style is present in people who have psychological problems and those 
who don't, which is why you have been asked to participate. In addition to this, we plan 
to assess how this questionnaire relates to certain aspects of emotions which are 
measured by another questionnaire. 
 
This study is being undertaken for educational purposes and will in part contribute 
towards a doctorate degree in clinical psychology in conjunction with the University of 
Edinburgh. Before you decide if you would like to participate it is important that you 
know a bit more about the study and what participation will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and raise any questions you may have with the 
study researcher (contact details are provided at the end of this page). Please ask if 
there is anything you are unclear about or if you would like more information. 
 
Why have I been approached? 
I am seeking participants who are aged 18 and over and whose first language is 
English. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. You can choose to withdraw at any time. 
 
What does participation involve? 
I am aiming to measure how stable one of these questionnaires remains over time and 
how it relates to another questionnaire. Therefore, I would appreciate your participation 
on two occasions, one month apart. Participation should take no more than 10 minutes 
on each occasion. You can save your results at any time and return to them later. 
 
When you begin participation you will be asked for your email address in order that I 
can contact you a month later to ask you to complete some of the questionnaires again. 
Submitting your email address implies that you consent to being contacted by myself 
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one month later. You will not be contacted again following this. If you do not wish to 
participate again on the second occasion, leave the space requesting your email 
address blank and continue with the rest of the questions. 
 
What happens to my results? 
Your questionnaire results will be stored securely by the University of Edinburgh 
computing services until the survey closes (approximately May 2010). The two 
University of Edinburgh administrators of the site can access some of your results but 
your email address is only accessible by myself as the results have been filtered. No-
one else will be able to access your results. Following the closure of the survey, the 
details I hold of your email address will be destroyed and you will not be contacted 
again. Your email address and results will be kept confidential at all times. On the 
second participation occasion you will be provided with a unique identifying number so 
that you will not need to re-enter your email address. The anonymised results will be 
submitted to the University of Edinburgh as part of my doctoral thesis. I may also decide 
to publish the results, however, at no time will your email address be disclosed to 
anyone else. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation will help with the development of this questionnaire. It will identify 
whether this questionnaire is reliable over time and how it relates to another 
questionnaire which measures aspects of emotions. When further developed, this 
questionnaire may be used to measure the level of change in people who are 
undergoing psychological therapy. 
 
Who can I contact? 
 
If you have been affected by anything in the survey then please feel free to contact the 
Study Researcher.  
 
If you have any queries about any aspect of the study or require further information, 
please do not hesitate to contact us at the address given below: 
 








School of Health in Social Science 
Medical School  
University of Edinburgh 




If you wish to take part: Please click on CONTINUE to start answering the questions. 
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There are 3 sections to be completed. 
 
If you do not wish to take part: I would like to thank you for taking the time to read 
through this information sheet. You can now close this page. 
 
The survey can be saved and returned to at any time and takes about 10 minutes to 
compete. 
 
Note that once you have clicked on the CONTINUE button at the bottom of each page 










Measuring Thinking Styles 
 
Information for Potential Participants 
 
I am undertaking a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology and as part of my research, I would 
like to invite you to complete my survey on thinking styles.  Completion of the survey 
should take approximately 10 minutes.  Please read on for further information. 
 
Purpose of the study 
This research is being carried out to measure a certain aspect of how people think.  
Unhelpful thinking styles are known to be important in the development of a range of 
psychological problems including anxiety and mood problems.  This study is part of a 
series of studies being run in different parts of the United Kingdom to develop a good 
quality questionnaire of certain ways of thinking.  We need to ask a lot of people to 
complete the questionnaire in order to know if it is a good measure of this thinking style.  
This thinking style is present in people who have psychological problems and those 
who don’t, therefore we are seeking a wide variety of people to complete the 
questionnaire.  In addition to this, we plan to assess how this questionnaire relates to 
aspects of emotions which are measured by another questionnaire. 
 
This study is being undertaken for educational purposes and will in part contribute 
towards a doctorate degree in clinical psychology in conjunction with the University of 
Edinburgh.  Before you decide if you would like to participate it is important that you 
know a bit more about the study and what participation will involve.  Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and raise any questions you may have with the 
study researcher (contact details are provided at the end of this sheet).  Please ask if 
there is anything you are unclear about or if you would like more information. 
 
Why have I been approached? 
I am seeking participants who are aged 18 and over and whose first language is 
English. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  Participation is entirely voluntary.  You can choose to withdraw at any time. 
 
What does participation involve? 
If you would like to take part then you will be asked to complete the attached 
questionnaires.  I am aiming to measure how stable one of these questionnaires 
remains over time and how it relates to another questionnaire.  Therefore, I would 
appreciate your participation on two occasions, one month apart.  Participation should 
take no longer than 10 minutes on each occasion and you will be asked to complete the 
same questionnaires on each occasion. 
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You will be asked to provide your name and address in order that I can contact you a 
month later with the second copy of the questionnaires.  Providing your name and 
address implies that you consent to being contacted by me one month later.  You will 
not be contacted again following this.  If you do not wish to participate again on the 
second occasion, leave the space requesting your name and address blank and 
continue with the rest of the questions. 
 
What happens to my results? 
Your questionnaire results will be stored confidentially and will only be accessible by 
myself.  Following completion of the questionnaires, I will remove your name and 
address from your results and use a unique number to identify them with.  Your name 
and address will be stored separately from your results.  Following your participation on 
the second occasion, the details I hold of your name and address will be destroyed and 
you will not be contacted again.  Your name, address and results will be kept 
confidential at all times.  The anonymised results will be submitted to the University of 
Edinburgh as part of my doctoral thesis.  I may also decide to publish the results, 
however, at no time will your name or address be disclosed to anyone else. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation will help with the development of this questionnaire.  It will identify 
whether this questionnaire is reliable over time and how it relates to another 
questionnaire which measures aspects of emotions.  When further developed, this 
questionnaire may be used to measure the level of change in people who are 
undergoing psychological therapy. 
 
If you wish to take part:  Please complete the attached questionnaires (within one 
month) and return them in the stamped addressed envelope.  There are 3 sections to 
be completed and this should take about 10 minutes. 
 
If you do not wish to take part:  I would like to thank you for taking the time to read 
through this information sheet.  You need do nothing more.   
 
Who can I contact? 
If you have been affected by anything in the questionnaires then please feel free to 
contact the Study Researcher below.  If you have any queries about any aspect of the 
study or require further information, please do not hesitate to contact us at the address 
given below: 
 
Miss Lindsey Campbell   Dr David Gillanders 
Study Researcher    Research Supervisor 
Clinical Psychology Department  Clinical Psychology Department 
School of Health in Social Science  School of Health in Social Science 
Medical School    Medical School 
University of Edinburgh   University of Edinburgh 
Teviot Place     Teviot Place 
Edinburgh     Edinburgh 
EH8 9AG     EH8 9AG 
 











During your participation in the research project measuring thinking styles, you 
indicated that you wished to be contacted if you had high scores on a screening 
questionnaire measuring symptoms of anxiety and depression.  I am writing to inform 
you that you did score more highly than the general population on the anxiety/depression 
aspect of this questionnaire. 
 
It is important to note that this questionnaire is a screening measure and does not 
diagnose anxiety or depression.  People can score highly on this questionnaire for a 
number of reasons and your scores do not necessarily indicate that you are clinically 
anxious or depressed. 
 











After reading this information, if you feel you require more help with your symptoms 
then please contact your General Practitioner at the practice you are registered with. 
 



















I am undertaking a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology and as part of my research, I would 
like to invite you to complete my survey on thinking styles.  Completion of the survey 
should take approximately 10 minutes.  Please access the link below for further 




I am hoping to recruit as many participants as possible.  If you know of anyone else who 






Clinical Psychology Department 
School of Health in Social Science 
Medical School 






 Appendix M 
 





You might remember that you agreed to participate in my research and completed some 
questionnaires about a month ago.  At this time, you kindly provided me with your email 
address in order that I could contact you again to complete some further questionnaires.  
Participation should take no longer than 10 minutes.  I would appreciate it if you could 
access the link below and complete the questionnaires.  When prompted, please enter 




This is the final time that I am requesting your participation.  You will not be contacted 
by me again unless you request feedback. 
 





Department of Clinical Psychology 
School of Health in Social Science 
Medical School 
University of Edinburgh 
Teviot Place 
Edinburgh 
EH8 9AG 
L.Campbell-13@sms.ed.ac.uk 
 
